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Abstract
This article gives a survey of Discourse Representation Theory DRT including recent developments and
with an emphasis on logical issues Discourse representation structures are dened and various prespectives on
their static and dynamic meaning are discussed This discussion leads to the study of the process of merging
representation structures a process which can be viewed as a strategy for memory management Next a
toy example fragment of English is presented with a compositional DRT semantics The nal sections are
devoted to the treatment of quantication and of tense and aspect
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  Introduction
The key idea behind the theory of the semantics of coherent multisentence discourse and
text that is presented in this paperDiscourse Representation Theory or DRT for short
is that each new sentence S of a discourse is interpreted in the context provided by the
sentences preceding it The result of this interpretation is that the context is updated with
the contribution made by S often an important part of this process is that anaphoric elements
of S are hooked up to elements that are present in the context An implication of this
conception of text interpretation is that one and the same structure serves simultaneously as
content and as contextas content of the sentences that have been interpreted already and
as context for the sentence that is to be interpreted next This double duty imposes special
constraints on logical form which are absent when as in most older conceptions of semantics
and pragmatics the contents and contexts are kept separate
The initial problem that motivated the present theory is the interpretation of nominal and
temporal anaphora in discourse The key idea in the way of thinking about the semantics
of discourse in context exemplied in Heim 	
 and Kamp 	 is that each new sentence or
phrase is interpreted as an addition to or update of the context in which it is used and
that this update often involves connections between elements from the sentence or phrase
with elements from the context
	 The Problem of Anaphoric Linking in Context  
In the approach of Kamp 	 which we will follow more closely here than the largely
equivalent approach of Heim 	
 this idea is implemented in the form of interpretation
ruleseach associated with a particular lexical item or syntactic construction When applied
to a given sentence S these rules identify the semantic contributions which S makes to the
context C in which S is used and add these to C In this way C is transformed into a new
context which carries the information contributed by S as well as the information that was
part of the context already The result can then serve as context for the interpretation of the
sentence following S in the given discourse or text which leads to yet another context and
so on until the entire discourse or text has been interpreted
An important aspect of this kind of updating of contexts is the introduction of elements
socalled reference markers or discourse referentsthat can serve as antecedents to anaphoric
expressions in subsequent discourse These reference markers play a key part in the the
context structures posited by DRT the socalled Discourse Representation Structures or
DRSs
With its emphasis on representing and interpreting discourse in context discourse repre
sentation theory has been instrumental in the emergence of a dynamic perspective on natural
language semantics where the centre of the stage occupied so long by the concept of truth
with respect to appropriate models has been replaced by context change conditions with
truth conditions dened in terms of those Thus under the inuence of discourse represen
tation theory many traditional Montague grammarians have made the switch from static to
dynamic semantics see the Chapter on Dynamics in this Handbook This shift has consid
erably enriched the enterprise of formal semantics by bringing areas formerly belonging to
informal pragmatics within its compass
In the next section we will rst look at some examples of DRSs and at the considerations
which have led to their specic form After that we will look more closely at the relationship
between DRSs and the syntactic structure of sentences discourses or texts from which they
can be derived This will lead us naturally to the much debated question whether the theory
presented here is compositional The compositionality issue will force us to look carefully at
the operations by means of which DRSs can be put together from minimal building blocks
Next we will show by developing a toy example what a compositional discourse semantics
for a fragment of natural language may look like This is followed by sample treatments of
quantication tense and aspect The paper ends with some pointers to the literature on
further extensions of the approach and to connections with related approaches
 The Problem of Anaphoric Linking in Context
The semantic relationship between personal pronouns and their antecedents was long per
ceived as being of two kinds a pronoun either functions as an individual constant coreferential
with its antecedent or it acts as a variable bound by its antecedent However in the exam
ples 
 below neither of these two possibilities seems to provide a correct account of how
pronoun and antecedent are related
 A man
 
entered He
 
smiled
 Every man who meets a nice woman
 
smiles at her
 

	 The Problem of Anaphoric Linking in Context 
 If a man
 
enters he
 
smiles
 Hob believes a witch
 
blighted his mare Nob believes she
 
killed his sow
In these examples we have used subscripts and superscripts to coindex anaphoric pronouns
and their intended antecedents
The rst optionof pronoun and antecedent being coreferentialdoes not work for the
simple reason that the antecedent does not refer as there is no one particular thing that can
be counted as the referent so a fortiori antecedent and pronoun cannot corefer that is
refer to the same thing The second option the bound variable analysis runs into problems
because the pronoun seems to be outside the scope of its antecedent For instance in 
 the
antecedent of the pronoun is an indenite noun phrase occurring in the preceding sentence In
the approaches which see pronouns as either coreferring terms or bound variables indenite
NPs are viewed as existential quantiers whose scope does not extend beyond the sentence
in which they occur In such an approach there is no hope of the pronoun getting properly
bound Examples 	 present similar diculties Example 	 is arguably ambiguous in that a
nice woman may be construed either as having wide or as having narrow scope with respect
to every man If a nice woman is construed as having narrow scope ie as having its scope
restricted to the relative clause then the pronoun wont be bound the phrase can bind the
pronoun if it is given wide scope as in that case its scope is the entire sentence but this leads
to an interpretation which though perhaps marginally possible is clearly not the preferred
reading of 	 We nd much the same problem with  in order that the indenite a man bind
the pronoun he it must be construed as having scope over the conditional as a whole and
not just over the ifclause but again this yields a reading that is marginal at best while the
preferred reading is not available
Sentences with the patterns of 	 and  have reached the modern semantic literature through
Geach 
 who traces them back to the Middle Ages and beyond Geachs discussion revolves
around examples with donkeys so these sentences became known in the literature as donkey
sentences Also due to Geach are sentences like  which pose a binding problem across a
sentential boundary complicated by the fact that antecedent and anaphoric element occur
in the scopes of dierent attitude predications with distinct subjects
Problems like the ones we encountered with 
 arise not just with pronouns There
are several other types of expressions with anaphoric uses that present essentially the same
diculties to the traditional ways of viewing the relationship between natural language and
logic First there are other anaphoric noun phrases besides pronouns viz denite descrip
tions and demonstratives and these also occur in the contexts where the problems we have
just noted arise Moreover as was remarked already more than twenty years ago in Partee
 there are striking similarities in the behaviour of anaphoric pronouns and tenses and it
turns out that the interpretation of tense involves the same sort of anaphoric dependencies
which 
 exhibit More precisely the past tense is often to be understood as referring to
some particular time in the past rather than meaning sometime in the past and more
often than not this particular time is to be recovered from the context in which the given
past tense sentence is used
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 John entered the room He switched on the light
 Whenever John entered the room he switched on the light
In  the switching time is understood as temporally related to the time at which John entered
the room presumably the time of switching was directly after the time of entering and a
full interpretation of  needs to make this explicit A quanticational sentence such as 
suggests the same relationship between switching times and entering times and insofar as
the tense of the main clause is to be interpreted as anaphoric to that of the wheneverclause
this anaphoric connection raises the same questions as those of 	 and 
 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation
The central concepts of DRT are best explained with reference to simple examples such as

 in the previous section The logical content of 
 appears to be that there was some man
who entered and then smiled That is the content of 
 is what in standard predicate logic
would be expressed by an existential quantication over material coming in part from the
rst and in another part from the second sentence of 
 roughly as in 
  xman x  entered x  smiled x
As observed in the last section according to DRT the interpretation of 
 results from a process
in which an interpretation is obtained for the rst sentence which then serves as context
for the interpretation of the second sentence The interpretation of the second sentence
transforms this context into a new context structure the content of which is essentially that
of 
The problem with 
 is that the rst sentence has an existential interpretation and thus
must in some way involve an existential quantier and that the contribution which the
second sentence makes to the interpretation of 
 must be within the scope of that quantier
Given the basic tenets of DRT this means that i the rst sentence of 
 must get assigned a
representation ie a DRS K
 
which captures the existential interpretation of that sentence
and ii this DRS K
 
must be capable of acting as context for the interpretation of the
second sentence in such a way that this second interpretation process transforms it into a
DRS K

representing the truth conditions identied by  i entails that the reference marker
introduced by the indenite NP a manlet it be xmust get an existential interpretation
within K
 
 and ii entails that it is nevertheless available subsequently as antecedent for
the pronoun he Finally after x has been so exploited in the interpretation of the second
sentence it must then receive once more an existential interpretation within the resulting
DRS K


Heim 	
 uses the metaphor of a ling cabinet for this process The established represen
tation structure K
 
is a set of le cards and additions to the discourse eect a new structure
K

 which is the result of changing the le in the light of the new information Here is how
DRT deals with these desiderata The DRS K
 
is as given in 

 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation 
	
x
man x
entered x
This can also be rendered in canonical settheoretical notation as in 

 fxg fman x entered xg
Precisely how this DRS is derived from the syntactic structure of the rst sentence of 
 and
how DRS construction from sentences and texts works generally is discussed in Section 
For now suce it to note that the reference marker x gets introduced when the NP a man is
interpreted and that this interpretation also yields the two conditions manx and enteredx
expressing that any admissible value a for x must be a man and that this man was one who
entered
A DRS like  can be viewed as a kind of model of the situation which the represented
discourse describes The modelled situation contains at least one individual a corresponding
to the reference marker x which satises the two conditions contained in  ie a is a man
and a is someone who entered
When a DRS is used as context in the interpretation of some sentence S its reference
markers may serve as antecedents for anaphoric NPs occurring in S In the case of our
example we have the following  serving as context for the second sentence of 
 makes
x available as antecedent for the pronoun he That is the interpretation of he links the
reference marker it introduces y say to the marker x for the intended antecedent something
we express by means of the equational condition y

 x In addition the interpretation step
yields as in the case of the indenite a man a condition expressing the clausal predication
which involves he as argument Through the application of this principle  gets expanded to
the DRS 
 which represents the content of all of 


x y
man x
enter x
y

 x
smiled y
DRS 
 models situations in which there is at least one individual that is a man that entered
and that smiled It is easy to see that these are precisely the situations which satisfy the
predicate formula  This claim will be made formal by the model theory for DRSs to be
presented in Section 
As illustrated by the above examples  and 
 a DRS generally consists of two parts i
a set of reference markers the universe of the DRS and ii a set of conditions its condition
set There are some other general points which our example illustrates

 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation 

 The reference markers in the universe of a DRS all get an existential interpretation
	 All reference markers in the universe of a context DRS are available as anaphoric
antecedents to pronouns and other anaphoric expressions that are interpreted within
this context
 The interpretation of a sentence S in the context provided by a DRS K results in a new
DRS K
 
 which captures not only the content represented by K but also the content of
S as interpreted with respect to K
It should be clear that DRSs such as  and 
 can only represent information that has
the logical form of an existentially quantied conjunction of atomic predications But there
is much information that is not of this form This is so in particular for the information
expressed by  So the DRS for  will have to make use of representational devices dierent
from those that we have used up to this point
The DRT conception of conditional information is this The antecedent of a conditional
describes a situation and the conditional asserts that this situation must also satisfy the
information specied in its consequent When conditionals are seen from this perspective it
is not surprising that the interpretation of their consequents may use the interpretations of
their antecedents as contexts much in the way the interpretation of a sentence S may build
upon the interpretation assigned to the sentences preceding it in the discourse to which it
belongs for the consequent extends the situation description provided by the antecedent in
essentially the same way in which S extends the situation described by its predecessors
In the case of  this means that the DRS  which represents its antecedent see the
discussion of 
 above can be exploited in the interpretation of the consequent just as  as
interpretation of the rst sentence of 
 supported the interpretation of the second sentence
of 
 To make this work out we need a suitable representation for the consequent This turns
out to be 



smile x
To obtain a representation of   and 

 must be combined in a way which reveals the
conditional connection between them We represent this combination by a double arrow in
between the two DRSs The result K  K
 
 where K and K
 
are the two DRSs to be
combined is a DRS condition a complex condition as opposed to the simple DRS conditions
we have encountered so far The DRS for a conditional sentence such as  will consist just
of such a condition and nothing else
Intuitively the meaning of a conditionK  K
 
is that a situation satisfyingK also satises
K
 
 This is indeed the semantics we adopt for such conditions for details see Section 
Applying this to the case of  we get the representation 
	

 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation 

x
man x
enter x

smile x
Conditions of the form K  K
 
illustrate an important feature of DRT The logical role
played by a reference marker depends on the DRSuniverse to which it belongs Markers
belonging to the universe of the main DRS get an existential interpretationthis is we
saw a consequence of the principle that a DRS is true if it is possible to nd individuals
corresponding to the reference markers in the DRS universe which satisfy its conditions This
principle however applies only to the reference markers in the main DRS universe The logic
of reference markers in subordinate universes such as for instance x in 
	 is determined
by the principles governing the complex DRS conditions to which they belong Thus the
semantics of conditions of the form K  K
 
implies that for all individuals corresponding to
reference markers in the universe of K which satisfy the conditions of K it is the case that K
 
is satisable as well Thus the condition of 
	 has the meaning that for every individual
corresponding to the marker xthat is for every man that entersthe right hand side DRS
of 
	 is satised ie that individual smiles Reference markers in the left hand side universe
of an condition thus get a universal not an existential interpretation
It is worth noting explicitly the ingredients to this solution of the semantic dilemma posed
by conditionals like  Crucial to the solution are

 the combination of the principles of DRS construction which assign to conditional
sentences such as  representations such as 
	 and
	 the semantics for conditions that has just been described
Like any other DRS 
	 is a pair consisting of a set of reference markers and a set of
conditions But in 
	 the rst of these sets is empty In particular the reference marker
x which does occur in 
	 belongs not to the universe of the main DRS of 
	 but to that
of a subordinate DRS which itself is a constituent of some DRS condition occurring in 
	
One important dierence between reference markers in such subordinate positions and those
belonging to the universe of the main DRS is that only the latter are accessible as antecedents
for anaphoric pronouns in subsequent sentences In general in order that a reference marker
can serve as antecedent to a subsequent pronoun it must be accessible from the position that
the pronoun occupies Compare for instance the discourses 
 and 

 A man came in He smiled He was holding a ower in his right hand
 If a man comes in he smiles He is holding a ower in his right hand
While in 
 the second he is as unproblematic as the rst he in 
 the second he is hard or
impossible to process This dierence is reected by the fact that in the DRS for the rst

 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation 
two sentences of 
 the reference marker for a man belongs to the universe of the main DRS
and so is accessible to the pronoun of the last sentence whereas in 
 this is not so
The rules for processing sentences in the context of a representation structure impose formal
constraints on availability of discourse referents for anaphoric linking The set of available
markers consists of the markers of the current structure plus the markers of structures that
can be reached from the current one by a series of steps in the directions left ie from
the consequent of a pair K  K
 
to the antecedent and up ie from a structure to an
encompassing structure
For universally quantied sentences such as 	 DRT oers an analysis that closely resembles
its treatment of conditionals According to this analysis a universally quantifying NP imposes
a conditional connection between its own descriptive content and the information expressed by
the predication in which it participates as argument phrase and this connection is interpreted
in the same way as the conditions that the theory uses to represent conditional sentences
In particular 	 gets an analysis in which any individual satisfying the descriptive content
man who meets a nice woman ie any individual corresponding to the reference marker x in
the DRS 
 satises the DRS representing the main predication of 	 According to this way
of looking at quantication the descriptive content of the quantifying phrase can be taken as
presupposed for purposes of interpreting the predication in which the phrase partakes just
as the antecedent of a conditional can be taken as given when interpreting its consequent
Thus just as we saw for the consequent of the conditional  the construction of the DRS for
the main predication of 	 may make use of information encoded in the descriptive content
DRS 
 The result is the DRS in 


x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet xy

u
u

 y
smilesat xu
To get a representation of 	 DRSs 
 and 
 have to be combined into a single DRS condition
It is clear that  has the desired eect The result is 

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
x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet xy

u
u

 y
smilesat xu
The constraints on marker accessibility are used to account for the awkwardness of anaphoric
links as in 

	 	If every man
 
meets a nice woman

 he
 
smiles at her


The dierence between pronominal anaphora and the variable binding we nd in classical
logic is also nicely illustrated by anaphora involving the word other Consider eg 


 A man walked in Another man followed him
Here another man is anaphoric to a man but the sense is that the twomen should be dierent
not that they are the same In other words while any phrase of the form another CN must
just as an anaphorically used pronoun nd an antecedent in its context of interpretation the
semantic signicance of the link is just the opposite here The DRS for 
 is 	

x y z
man x
walkin x
y  x
man y
z

 x
follow yz
Note that the representation of otheranaphora always needs two reference markers one
introduced by the anaphoric NP itself and one for the antecedent there is no question here of
replacing the former marker by the latter that is eliminating the y at the top of 	 and the
inequality y  x and replacing the other occurrences of y by x as that would force the two
men to be the same rather than dierent In this regard otheranaphora diers from pronoun
anaphora for which the substitution treatment yields representations that are equivalent to
the ones we have been constructing above
One reason for preferring the treatment of pronoun anaphora we have adopted is that it
brings out the similarity as well as the dierence between pronouns and phrases with other 
In both cases interpretation involves the choice of a suitable antecedent But the links
between the chosen antecedent and the marker for the anaphoric NP are dierent in nature
they express equality in one case inequality in the other

 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation 	

We have said something about the interpretation of three kinds of NPs indenite descrip
tions anaphoric pronouns and quantied NPs and we have introduced linking as a central
theme in DRT More about quantication in Section 
 We will now briey turn to denite
descriptions One of the most obvious facts about them but a fact systematically ignored or
played down in the classical theories of denoting phrases Frege 
 Russell  Strawson
 is that like pronouns denite descriptions often act as anaphoric expressions
Indeed there seems to be a kind of interchangeability in the use of pronouns and descrip
tions with a description taking the place of a pronoun in positions where the latter would
create an unwanted ambiguity thus in discourses like 	
 the use of a denite description in
the second sentence serves to disambiguate the intended anaphoric link
 A man and a boy came in The man
he smiled
Anaphoric denite descriptions are like pronouns linked to existing discourse referents and
thus like pronouns they impose certain conditions on the context in which they are used
the context must contain at least one discourse referent that can serve as an antecedent In
this sense both pronouns and anaphoric denite descriptions may be said to carry a certain
presupposition only when the context satises this presupposition is it possible to interpret
the pronoun or to interpret the description anaphorically The descriptive content then
serves as information to guide the anaphora resolution process This will permit anaphora
resolution in cases like 	

Matters are not always this simple however Denite descriptions have uses that can
hardly be described as anaphoric For instance in 		 the description the street is certainly
not anaphoric in the strict sense of the word for there is no antecedent part of the given
discourse which has introduced an element that the description can be linked up with
 A man was walking down the street He was smiling
It is argued in Heim 	
 that the use of a denite description is a means for the speaker to
convey that he takes the referent of the description to be in some sense familiar The hearer
who is already acquainted with the street that is intended as the referent of the street by
the speaker of 		 may be expected to interpret the description as referring to this street in
such cases speaker and hearer are said to share a common ground see eg Stalnaker 
which includes the street in question and it is this which enables the hearer to interpret the
speakers utterance as he meant it Such common grounds can also be represented in the
form of DRSs Thus the common ground just referred to will contain at a minimum a
component of the form 	 where we assume that the marker u in 	 is anchored to a suitable
object the street that speaker and hearer have in mind

u
street u
On the assumption of such a common ground DRS including a suitable anchor it becomes
possible to view the NP the street of 		 as anaphoric Interpretation of 		 will then be relative
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to the context DRS 	 and the interpretation of its denite description will yield by the same
principle that governs the interpretation of the man in 	
 a DRS like 	

u x v y
street u
man x
v

 u
street v
waswalkingdown xv
y

 x
wassmiling y
This way of dealing with denite descriptions such as the street in 	 may seem to restore
uniformity to the analysis of denites An important dierence between denite descriptions
and pronouns remains however Denite descriptions can be linked much more easily than
pronouns to objects that are implicit in the common ground but have not been explicitly
introduced by earlier parts of the same discourse
To assimilate the use of denite descriptions as unique identiers the use that Frege and
Russell focus on to the exclusion of all others to the present anaphoric analysis one must
allow for accommodation When the context available to the hearer does not contain a
representation of the referent of a denite description he may accommodate this context so
that it now does contain such a representation and then proceed as if the representation had
been there all along However under what conditions precisely accommodation is possible is
still a largely unsolved problem
Interesting cases where the anaphoric account and the unique identication account of
denite description have to be combined are the socalled bridging descriptions as in 	
and 	
 Yesterday an MP was killed The murderer got away
 Usually when an MP is killed the murderer gets away
In 	 the murderer is naturally interpreted as referring to the murderer of the MP mentioned
in the preceding sentence In other words the context provides a referent x and the denite
description is interpreted as the unique individual who murdered x This account also works
for 	 where x varies over murdered MPs and the denite description ranges over the set
of unique murderers for all those x
We conclude with a brief remark on proper names As has been emphasised in the philo
sophical literature see in particular Kripke  a proper name has no descriptive content
or at any rate its descriptive content plays no essential part in the way it refers One con
sequence of this is that a name cannot have more than one referential value a point which
should not be confused with the evident fact that many namesFred Fido John Smith
Fayettevilleare many ways ambiguous This means that a name cannot have the sort of
anaphoric use which we found with the murderer in 	 and 	 and that the antecedent to
 Discourse Representation Structures 	 
which the reference marker for a name will have to be linked will always be a marker in the
main universe of the context DRS Logically speaking therefore a proper name will always
have maximally wide scope One might think about this process in several ways One might
assume as in the construction rule for proper names in Kamp 	 that the processing of
a proper name always leads to the introduction of a marker in the top DRS even if the
name gets processed in a subordinate DRS somewhere way down Or one might assume an
external element in the semantics of proper names namely the presence of external anchors
reference markers that are already in place in the top box of a DRS Any proper name then
comes equipped with its xed anaphoric index for linking the name to its anchor This is the
approach we will follow in Section 
 Discourse Representation Structures
It is now time to turn to formal details Let A be a set of constants and U a set of reference
markers or discourse referents variables in fact We also assume that a set of predicate
letters with their arities is given In the following denition c ranges over A v over the set
U  and P over the set of predicates
Denition  DRSs preliminary denition
terms t  v j c
conditions C   j Pt
 
   t
k
j v

 t j v  t j D
DRSs D  fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g
Note that this denition of the representation language is provisional it will be modied in
Section  We introduce the convention that D
 
 D

is shorthand for
fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
D

g
where D
 
 fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g
As in the previous sections DRSs will sometimes be presented in the box notation
DRSs D 
v
 
  v
n
C
 



C
m
The abbreviation D
 
 D

is rendered in box format by the agreement to write 	 as 	
 
v
 
  v
n
C
 



C
m

  



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	
v
 
  v
n
C
 



C
m

  



Conditions can be atoms links or complex conditions Complex conditions are negations
or implications As the implications are abbreviations for special negations we can assume
that all complex conditions are negations
An atom is the symbol  or a predicate name applied to a number of terms constants
or discourse referents a link is an expression v

 t or v  t where v is a marker and t is
either a constant or a marker The clause for complex conditions uses recursion a complex
condition is a condition of the form D where D is a discourse representation structure
We will rst give a static truth denition for discourse representation structures Later
on when discussing the problem of compositionality for DRSs we turn to a context change
formulation of those same conditions Call a rst order model M  hM Ii we assume the
domain M is nonempty an appropriate model for DRS D if I maps the nplace predicate
names in the atomic conditions of D to nplace relations on M  the individual constants
occurring in the link conditions of D to members of M  and here is the recursive part of the
denition M is also appropriate for the DRSs in the complex conditions of D
LetM  hM Ii be an appropriate model for DRS D An assignment s forM  hM Ii is a
mapping of the set of reference markers U to elements ofM  The term valuation determined
by M and s is the function V
Ms
dened by V
Ms
t  It if t  A and V
Ms
t  st if
t  U  In the following denition we use sX s
 
for s
 
agrees with s except possibly on the
values of the members of X 
Denition  Assignments verifying a DRS
An assignment s veries D  fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g in M if there is an assignment s
 
with sfv
 
     v
n
gs
 
which satises every member of fC
 
     C
m
g in M
Denition  Assignments satisfying a condition
 s always satises  in M
 s satises P t
 
     t
n
 in M i hV
Ms
t
 
     V
Ms
t
n
i  IP 
 s satises v

 t in M i sv  V
Ms
t
 s satises v  t in M i sv  V
Ms
t
 s satises D in M i s does not verify D in M
Denition  Structure D is true in M if there is an assignment which veries D in M
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Note that it follows from denition  that fxg fPxyg is true in M i fx yg fPxyg is
true in M In other words free variables are existentially quantied
We leave it to the reader to check that the denition of verifying assignments yields the
following requirement for conditions of the form D
 
 D


	 s satises D
 
 D

in M where D
 
 X fC
 
     C
k
g i every assignment s
 
with
sX s
 
which satises C
 
     C
k
in M veries D

in M
These denitions are easily modied to take anchors partial assignments of values to xed
referents into account This is done by focusing on assignments extending a given anchor
It is not dicult to see that the expressive power of basic DRT is the same as that of
rst order logic In fact there is an easy recipe for translating representation structures to
formulae of predicate logic Assuming that discourse referents can do duty as predicate logical
variables the atomic and link conditions of a representation structure are atomic formulae of
predicate logic The translation function

which maps representation structures to formulae
of predicate logic is dened as follows
Denition  Translation from DRT to FOL
	 For DRSs if D  fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g then
D

  v
 
    v
n
C

 
     C

m

	 For atomic conditions ie atoms or links C

 C
	 For negations D

 D


It follows from this that the translation instruction for implications becomes assume D
 

fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g
	 D
 
 D



 
v
 
   
v
n
C

 
     C

m
 D



The following is now easy to show
Proposition  s veries D in M i M s j D

 where j is Tarskis denition of satisfac
tion for rst order predicate logic
It is also not dicult to give a meaning preserving translation from rst order predicate logic
to basic DRT In the following denition 

is the DRS corresponding to the predicate logical
formula  and 

 
and 


are its rst and second components
Denition  Translation from FOL to DRT
	 For atomic formulas C

  C
	 For conjunctions   

  f

 

g
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	 For negations 

 


	 For quantications  v

 

 
 fvg 



Proposition 	 M s j  i s veries 

inM where j is Tarskis denition of satisfaction
for rst order predicate logic
The dierence between rst order logic and basic DRT has nothing to do with expressive
power but resides entirely in the dierent way in which DRT handles context The importance
of this new perspective on context and context change is illustrated by the following examples
with their DRS representations

 Someone did not smile He was angry
 Not everyone smiled 	He was angry
A suitable DRS representation ignoring tense for the rst sentence of 	 is the following

x
person x

smile x
Here we see that the pronoun he in the next sentence of 	 can be resolved by linking it to
the marker x occurring in the top box The anaphoric possibilities of  are dierent witness
its DRS representation 	

 x
person x

smile x
In this case there is no suitable marker available as an antecedent for he in the next sentence
of 
What we see here is that DRSs with the same truth conditions such as 
 and 	 may
nevertheless be semantically dierent in an extended sense The context change potentials
of 
 and 	 are dierent as the former creates a context for subsequent anaphoric links
whereas the latter does not This is as it should be of course as the pronoun in the second
sentence of 	 can pick up the reference marker in the rst sentence but the pronoun in the
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second sentence of  cannot The comparison of 
 and 	 illustrates that meaning in the
narrow sense of truth conditions does not exhaust the concept of meaning for DRSs The
extended sense of meaning in which 
 and 	 are dierent can be informally phrased as
follows 
 creates a new context that can furnish an antecedent for a pronoun is subsequent
discourse 	 does not This is because 
 changes the context whereas 	 does not
 The Static and Dynamic Meaning of Representation Structures
DRT has often been criticized for failing to be compositional It is important to see what
this criticism could mean and to distinguish between two possible ways it could be taken
According to the rst of these DRT fails to provide a direct compositional semantics for
the natural language fragments to which it is applied Given the form in which DRT was
originally presented this charge is justiable or at least it was so in the past We will address
it in Section  In its second interpretation the criticism pertains to the formalism of DRT
itself This objection is groundless As Denitions 	 and  more or less directly imply the
formal language of Denition 
 is as compositional as standard predicate logic We can make
the point more explicit by rephrasing Denitions 	 and  as a denition of the semantic values
 
M
that is assigned to each of the terms conditions and DRSs of the DRT language by an
appropriate modelM As values for DRSs inM we use pairs hXF i consisting of a nite set
of reference markers X  U and a set of functions F M
U
 and as meanings for conditions
we use sets of assignments
Denition 
 Semantics of DRSs
fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g
M
 fv
 
     v
n
g C
 

M
     C
m

M

Denition  Semantics of conditions
 P t
 
     t
n

M
 fs M
U
j hV
Ms
t
 
     V
Ms
t
n
i  IP g
 v

 t
M
 fs M
U
j sv  V
Ms
tg
 v  t
M
 fs M
U
j sv  V
Ms
tg
 D
M
 fs M
U
j for no s
 
M
U
 sX s
 
and s
 
 Fg
where XF   D
M

To see the connection with the earlier denition of verication 	 note that the following
proposition holds
Proposition 
	 s veries D in M i D
M
 hXF i and there is an s
 
M
U
with sX s
 
and s
 
 F 
	 D is true in M i D
M
 hXF i and F  
If one asks what are the DRS components of a DRS fv
 
     v
n
g fC
 
     C
m
g then the
answer has to be there arent any For those who do not like this answer it turns out to be
possible to view DRSs as built from atomic building blocks which are also DRSs This was
rst pointed out by Zeevat  The DRS language is now given in a slightly dierent way
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Denition  Building DRSs from atomic DRSs
 If v is a reference marker fvg  is a DRS
 If  fg is a DRS
 If P is an nary predicate and t
 
     t
n
are terms
then  fP t
 
     t
n
g is a DRS
 If v is a reference marker and t is a term then  fv

 tg is a DRS
 If v is a reference marker and t is a term then  fv  tg is a DRS
 If D is a DRS then D is a DRS
 If D  XC and D
 
 X
 
 C
 
 are DRSs
then X X
 
 C  C
 
 is a DRS
 Nothing else is a DRS
It is clear that this denes the same DRS language Let us use  for the construction step
that forms negated DRSs that is we use D for D and  for the operation of merging
the universes and the constraint sets of two DRSs that is if D  XC and D
 
 X
 
 C
 

then D D
 
 X X
 
 C  C
 

Under this DRS denition DRSs have become structurally ambiguous DRS fxg fPxQxg
for example has several possible construction histories
	 fxg   fPxg  fQxg
	 fxg   fQxg  fPxg
	 fxg   fPxg  fQxg
	 and so on
The DRS semantics to be given next ensures that these structural ambiguities are harmless
the semantic operation corresponding to  is commutative and associative
The following two semantic operations correspond to the syntactic operations  on
DRSs note that we overload the notation by calling the semantic operations by the same
names as their syntactic counterparts
hXF i  hYGi  hX  Y F  Gi
hXF i  h fg M
U
j  f  F with gX fgi
The DRS semantics now looks like this
Denition 
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 fvg 
M
 fvgM
U

  fg
M
 M
U

  fPt
 
     t
n
g
M
  ff M
U
j hV
Mf
t
 
     V
Mf
t
n
i  IP g
  fv

 tg
M
  ff M
U
j fv  V
Mf
tg
  fv  tg
M
  ff M
U
j fv  V
Mf
tg
 D
M
 D
M

 DD
 

M
 D
M
 D
 

M

Clearly this provides an elegant and compositional modeltheoretic semantics for DRSs
Moreover it is easily veried that Denition 
 is equivalent to Denitions  and 
 in the
sense that if D
M
 hXF i then for any assignment s s  F i s veries D in M
The semantics considered so far denes the truth conditions of DRSs But as we noted at
the end of section  there is more to the meaning of a DRS than truth conditions alone
For DRSs which dene the same truth conditions may still dier in their context change
potentials
To capture dierences in context change potential and not just in truth conditions we
need a dierent kind of semantics which makes use of a more nely dierentiated and thus
necessarily of a more complex notion of semantic value There are several ways in which
this can be achieved The one which we follow in the next denition denes the semantic
value of a DRS as a relation between assignments  between input assignments which verify
the context to which the DRS is being evaluated and output assignments which reect the
way in which the DRS modies this context A semantics which characterizes the meaning
of an expression in terms of its context change potential is nowadays usually referred to as
dynamic semantics while a semantics like that of the Denitions 	 and  or Denitions 
and 
 whose central concern is with conditions of truth is called static The rst explicit
formulation of a dynamic semantics in this sense can be found in Barwise  An elegant
formulation is given in Groenendijk  Stokhof 

Although they are quite dierent from a conceptual point of view the dynamic and the
static semantics for formalisms like those of DRT are nonetheless closely connected Thus
if we denote the dynamic value of DRS D in model Mie the relation between assign
ments ofM which D determinesas
s
D
M
s
 
 with s the input assignment and s
 
the output
assignment we have
	 If D  XC then
s
D
M
s
 
i sX s
 
and s
 
veries D in M
We can also characterize this relation directly by a denition that is compositional in a
similar spirit as Denition 
 in that it characterizes the dynamic value of a complex DRS in
terms of the dynamic values of its constituents It will be convenient to base this denition
on a slightly dierent syntactic characterization of the DRS formalism than we have used
hitherto one in which the symmetric merge of Denition 
 is replaced by an asymmetric
merge  dened as follows
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	 If D  XC and D
 
 Y C
 
 then D D
 
 XC  C
 
 is a DRS
It is clear that all DRSs can be built from atomic DRSs using  and  but note that 
disregards the universe of its second argument
The dynamic semantics is given as follows We use
s
D
M
s
 
for s s
 
is an input output state
pair for D in modelM and svs
 
for s and s
 
dier at most in the value for v
Denition 

s
fvg 
M
s
 
i svs
 


s
 fg
M
s
 
i s  s
 


s
 fPt
 
     t
n
g
M
s
 
i s  s
 
and hV
Ms
t
 
     V
Ms
t
n
i  IP 

s
 fv

 tg
M
s
 
i s  s
 
and sv  V
Ms
t

s
 fv  tg
M
s
  
i s  s
 
and sv  V
Ms
t

s
D
M
s
 
i s  s
 
and for no s
  
it is the case that
s
D
M
s
  


s
D D
 

M
s
 
i
s
D
M
s
 
and
s
 
D
 

M
s
 

The static and the dynamic semantics of DRSs are equivalent for we have the following
proposition
Proposition  D
M
 hXF i sX s
 
 s
 
 F i
s
D
M
s
 

Still the relation between static and dynamic semantics that we have given here leaves some
thing to be desired The composition operations for static semantics and dynamic semantics
are dierent The basic reason for this is that the dynamic semantics has a notion of sequen
tiality built in a notion of processing in a given order Therefore the commutative merge
operation  does not quite t the dynamic semantics  is commutative and sequential
merging of DRSs intuitively is not The operation  is not commutative but it is unsatisfac
tory because it discards the dynamic eect of the second DRS which is treated as if it had
an empty universe
To give a true account of the context change potential of DRSs one has to be able to answer
the question how the context change potential of a DRS D
 
and that of a DRS D

which
follows it determine the context change potential of their composition This leads directly
to the question how DRSs can be built from constituent DRSs by an operation of sequential
merging
 Sequential Composition of Representation Structures
Taking unions of universes and constraint sets is a natural commutative merge operation
on DRSs but it is not quite the operation on DRS meanings one would expect given the
dynamic perspective on DRS semantics Intuitively the process of gluing an existing DRS
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representing the previous discourse to a DRS representation for the next piece of natural
language text is a process of sequential composition a process which one would expect not
to be commutative
How should DRS meanings be composed sequentially! Before we address this question
it is convenient to switch to a slightly modied language for DRSs It turns out that if
one introduces a sequencing operator  the distinction between DRSs and conditions can be
dropped This move yields the following language that we will call the language of protoDRSs
or pDRSs
pDRSs D  v j  j Pt
 
   t
n
j v

 t j D j D
 
D


In this language a reference marker taken by itself is an atomic pDRS and pDRSs are com
posed by means of  Thus introductions of markers and conditions can be freely mixed
Although we drop the distinction between markers and conditions and that between condi
tions and pDRSs a pDRS of the form v will still be called a marker and one of the form
 Pt
 
   t
n
 v

 t or D a condition Thus a pDRS is a reference marker or an atomic
condition or a negation or a composition of pDRSs
From now on we will consider v  t as an abbreviation of v

 t and D
 
 D

as an
abbreviation of D
 
D

 It will turn out that the process of merging pDRSs with  is
associative so we will often drop parentheses where it does no harm and write D
 
D

D

for both D
 
D

D

 and D
 
 D

D


It is possible to give a commutative semantics for pDRSs by using the semantic operation
 to interpret and  to interpret 
Denition  Commutative Semantics of pDRSs
 v
M
 hfvgM
U
i
 
M
 hM
U
i
 Pt
 
     t
n

M
 h ff M
U
j hV
Mf
t
 
     V
Mf
t
n
i  IP gi
 v

 t
M
 h ff M
U
j fv  V
Mf
tgi
 D
M
 D
M

 DD
 

M
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M
 D
 

M

This interpretation of  makes merging of pDRSs into a commutative operation To see the
eect of this look for instance at examples  and 
 A man entered
 A boy smiled
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How should pDRSs for these examples be merged! The commutative merge that we just
dened gives the result 

x
man x
enter x

x
boy x
smile x

x
man x
enter x
boy x
smile x
In the pDRT semantics the two discourse referents for a man and a a boy will be fused for
according to the operation  the fact that a marker is mentioned more than once is irrelevant
This shows that  cannot be the right translation of the sequential composition of  and

A dierent approach to merging pDRSs is suggested by the fact that in a dynamic per
spective merging in left to right order has a very natural relational meaning
	
s
D
 
D


M
s
 
i there is an assignment s
  
with
s
D
 

M
s
  
and
s
  
D


M
s
 

This semantic clause complies with the intuition that the rst pDRS is interpreted in an
initial context s yielding a new context s
  
 and this new context serves as the initial context
for the interpretation of the second pDRS
Once we are here a natural way to extend the dynamic approach to the full language
suggests itself as was noted by Groenendijk and Stokhof in 
 Their observation is basically
this If we interpret the DRS conditions in terms of pairs of assignments the dynamic
semantic values of DRS conditions can be given in the same form as the dynamic values of
DRSs
At rst sight DRS conditions do not look like context changers If s s
 
 is a context
pair for a condition then always s  s
 
 representing the fact that the condition does not
change anything But who cares! If we allow degenerate context changers we can drop
the distinction between conditions and DRSs altogether What is more even the distinction
between marker introductions and conditions is not essential for the introduction of a marker
u can also be interpreted in terms of context pairs and the introduction of a list of markers
can be obtained by merging the introductions of the components
These considerations yield the following relational semantics for the pDRS format this is
in fact the semantic format of the dynamic version of rst order predicate logic dened in
Groenendijk and Stokhof 

Denition  Relational Semantics of pDRSs

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 
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 
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 
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Truth is dened in terms of this as follows
Denition 	 Truth in relational semantics for pDRSs D is true in M given s
notation M s j D i there is an s
 
with
s
D
M
s
 

Note that the dierence with the previous semantics denition 
 resides in the interpreta
tion of  and has nothing to do with with the static dynamic opposition To see that observe
that the relational semantics denition 
 can also be given a static formulation For that
the only change one has to make to denition 
 is in the clause for D
 
D

 by interpreting
 as the operation  dened as follows
hXF i  hX
 
 F
 
i  hX X
 
 ff
 
 F
 
j  f  F f X
 
f
 
gi
Given this change to denition 
 we have the following proposition
Proposition 
 M s j D i D  hXF i and  f  F with sX f 
So we see that 
 can be given an equivalent static formulation Conversely it is not hard to
give a relational clause for 
fR Sg  f R

 S

g  g  rng R rng S
where R

 fv  U j f g  R  fv  gvg and similarly for S


According to the relational semantics of Denition 
  and  have the same meanings
 x y man x woman y love xy
 x man x y woman y love xy
This means that we can use the same box representation  for both
	
x y
man x
woman y
love xy
Unfortunately other examples show that the box notation does not really t the relational
semantics for the pDRSs given in denition 
 The use of collecting discourse referents
in universes as it is done in the box format is that this allows one to see the anaphoric
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possibilities of a representation at a glance the discourse referents in the top box are the
markers available for subsequent anaphoric linking
However when the composition operation  is interpreted as in Denition 
 or alter
natively as the operation  the pDRS notation becomes capable of expressing distinctions
that cannot be captured in the box notation we have been using Note for instance that
the pDRSs in  and  are not equivalent with regard to the semantics of Denition 

although they are equivalent with regard to that given by the unmodied Denitions  and



 x man x dog y y woman y love xy
 x y man x dog y woman y love xy
To take this dierence into account the box representation for  would have to be some
thing like 


x y
man x woman y
dog y love xy
The vertical dividing line in 
 separates the occurrences of y that receive their interpretation
from the previously given context from those that are linked to the new introduction
Thus we see that the relational semantics for pDRSs provides a natural notion of sequential
merging which allows sharing of introduced markers between two DRSs However it dis
tinguishes between dierent introductions of the same marker This introduces a problem of
destructive assignment  after a new introduction of a marker v that was already present its
previous value is lost This feature of denition 
 is the root cause of the mismatch between
box representation and sequential presentation that we just noted It is also the source of the
nonequivalence of the commutative and the relational composition semantics for the pDRS
format
For a fruitful discussion of the problem of sequential merge it is necessary to be clear
about the nature of the dierent kinds of marker occurrences in a pDRS In the following
discussion we compare the role of reference markers with that of variables in classical logic
and in programming languages Classical logic has two kinds of variable occurrences bound
and free In the dynamic logic that underlies DRT there are three kinds of variable or marker
occurrences see Visser 

 marker occurrences that get their reference xed by the larger context
	 marker occurrences that get introduced in the current context
 markers occurrences that get introduced in a subordinate context
We will call the rst kind xed marker occurrences the second kind introduced marker occur
rences and the third kind classically bound marker occurrences The rst kind corresponds
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roughly to the free variable occurrences of classical logic and the third kind to the bound vari
able occurrences of classical logic hence the name The second kind is altogether dierent
these are the markers that embody the context change potential of a given pDRS
As the distinction between these three kinds of marker occurrences is given by dynamic
considerations it is not surprising that there is a close connection with the various roles that
variables can play in imperative programming Here are the correspondences

 Fixed markers correspond to variables in read memory
	 Introduced markers correspond to variables in write memory
 Bound markers correspond to scratch memory memory used for intermediate compu
tations that are not part of the output of the program under consideration
Due to the semantic motivation for this tripartite distinction the formal denition will
depend on the semantics for  that we adopt We will give the denition based on the
relational semantics
The set of discourse referents which have a xed occurrence in a pDRS is given by a function
x  pDRSs  PU  The set of discourse referents which are introduced in a pDRS is given
by a function intro  pDRSs PU  and the set of discourse referents which have a classically
bound occurrence in a pDRS is given by a function cbnd  pDRSs  PU  To dene these
functions we rst dene a function var on the atomic conditions of a DRS
varPt
 
   t
n
  ft
i
j 
  i  n t
i
 Ug
varv

 t 
 
fv tg if t  U
fvg otherwise
Denition  x intro cbnd
	 xv   introv  fvg cbndv  
	 x   intro   cbnd  
	 xPt
 
   t
n
  varPt
 
   t
n
 introPt
 
   t
n
   cbndPt
 
   t
n
  
	 xv

 t  varv

 t introv

 t   cbndv

 t  
	 xD  xD introD   cbndD  introD cbndD
	 xD
 
D

  xD
 
  xD

 introD
 

introD
 
D

  introD
 
  introD


cbndD
 
D

  cbndD
 
  cbndD


We will occasionally use activD for the set of markers xD  introD
The set of conditions of a pDRS is given by the function cond  pDRSs PpDRSs which
collects the conditions of D together in a set
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Denition  cond
 condv  
 cond  fg
 condPt
 
   t
n
  fPt
 
   t
n
g
 condv

 t  fv

 tg
 condD  fDg
 condD
 
D

  condD
 
  condD


Note that there are pDRSs D with introD xD   An example is given in 	
 Px xQx
Also there are pDRSs D where a marker is introduced more than once An example is given
in 
 xPx xQx
We will call a pDRS proper or a DRS if these situations do not occur Thus the set of
DRSs is dened as follows
Denition  DRSs
	 If v is a marker then v is a DRS
	  is a DRS
	 If t
 
     t
n
are terms and P is an nplace predicate letter then Pt
 
   t
n
is a DRS
	 If v is a marker and t is a term then v

 t is a DRS
	 If D is a DRS then D is a DRS
	 If D
 
 D

are DRSs and xD
 
  introD
 
 introD

   then D
 
D

is a DRS
	 Nothing else is a DRS
Note that examples 	 and  are not DRSs Indeed we have
Proposition  For every DRS D introD xD  
Proposition 	 entails that DRSs of the form D v are equivalent to vD This means that
any DRS D can be written in box format  without change of meaning Indeed we can
view the box format for DRSs as an abstract version of the underlying real syntax
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
introD
condD
Note that if a DRS D has introD   and condD   then D must be of the formD
 
D


where xD
 
 introD
 
 introD

   We say that D is a simple merge of D
 
and D


According to the DRS denition DRSs are either of one of the forms in  or they are
simple merges of two DRSs but note that taking simple merges is a partial operation

v
 Pt
 
   t
n
v

 t D
For DRSs the truth conditions according to the commutative semantics coincide with those
according to the relational semantics
Proposition  For all models M all DRSs D
if D
M
 hXF i then
s
D
M
s
 
i sX s
 
and s
 
 F
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To get a clear perspective on the problem of merging DRSs note that the issue does not even
occur in an approach where a natural language discourse is processed by means of a DRS
construction algorithm that proceeds by deconstructing natural language sentences in the
context of a given DRS as in Kamp 	 or Kamp and Reyle 	
The problem emerges as soon as one modies this architecture by switching to a setup
where representations for individual sentences are constructed rst and next these have to
be merged in left to right order Suppose we want to construct a DRS for the sequential
composition of S
 
and S

on the basis of a DRS D
 
for S
 
and a DRS D

for S

 Now it
might happen that D
 
D

is not a DRS because xD
 
 introD
 
 introD

   Our
idea is to resolve this situation by applying a renaming strategy In the example sentences
given so far the problem has been avoided by a prudent choice of indices but example 
would pose such a conict
 A man
 
entered A boy
 
smiled
The initial representation for the sequential composition ofD
 
andD

can be given byD
 
	D


The problem of sequential merge now takes the form of nding strategies for reducing DRS
like expressions with occurrences of 	 to DRSs
Before we list of a number of options for merge reduction we dene a class of reducible
DRSs or RDRSs assume D ranges over DRSs
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RDRSs R  D j R j R
 
	R


Thus RDRSs are compositions out of DRSs by means of  and 	 It is useful to extend the
denitions of intro x and cbnd to RDRSs
Denition  x intro cbnd for RDRSs
	 xR  xR introR   cbndR  introR  cbndR
	 xR
 
	R
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  xR
 
  xR

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 

introR
 
	R

 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 
  introR


cbndR
 
	R

  cbndR
 
  cbndR


We use 	 for sequential merge The various options for how to merge DRSs all have a semantic
and a syntactic side for they must handle two questions

 What is the semantics of 	!
	 How can RDRSs be reduced to DRSs!
In order to talk about these reductions in a sensible way we must take negative context into
account Here is a denition of negative contexts D ranges over DRSs R over RDRSs
Negative Contexts N    j N j N D j DN j N 	R j R 	N
Condition on N D activNintroD   Condition on DN activDintroN  
where activN and introN are calculated on the basis of intro   x   cbnd  

What the denition says is that a negative context is an RDRS with one constituent RDRS
immediately within the scope of a negation replaced by   If N is a negative context then
N R is the result of substituting RDRS R for   in N  The denition of negative contexts
allows us to single out an arbitrary negated subRDRS R of a given RDRS by writing that
RDRS in the form N R
Contexts C    j N 
A context is either a   or a negative context If C is a context then CR is the result of
substituting RDRS R for   in N  Thus if we want to say that a reduction rule applies to
an RDRS R that may but need not occur immediately within the scope of a negation sign
within a larger RDRS we say that the rule applies to CR If we specify a reduction rule
R  R
 

this is meant to be understood as licensing all reductions of the form
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CR  CR
 

This format ensures that the rule can both apply at the top level and at a level bounded by
a negation sign inside a larger RDRS
We will now discuss several options for merge reduction symmetric merge prudent merge
destructive merge deterministic merge with substitution and indeterministic merge with
substitution
Symmetric Merge Interpret 	 as  and  as  The reduction rules that go with this are
R 	 v  vR
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 R
R 	 Pt
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	R
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 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 
 	R


Partial Merge Interpret 	 as a partial operation see eg Muskens  while retaining 
as the interpretation of  as we will do throughout the remainder of this section To give
the semantics we have to take context into account Assume that the semantics of a DRS D
is given as a triple hX Y F i where X  xD Y  introD and F is a set of assignments
then the following partial operation gives the semantics of partial merge
hX Y F i  hX
 
 Y
 
 F
 
i 
 
hX X
 
 Y  Y
 
 F  F
 
i if X  Y   Y
 
 
 otherwise
The reduction rules that go with this same as above except for the following change in the
rules that handle marker introductions
R 	 v  R v if v  xR introR
R 	 v  ERROR if v  xR introR
R 	 v 	R
 
  R v 	R
 
 if v  xR introR
R 	 v 	R
 
  ERROR if v  xR introR
Prudent Merge To give the semantics of prudent merging for 	 see Visser  one again
has to take context fully into account
hX Y F i  hX
 
 Y
 
 F
 
i  hX  X
 
 Y  Y  Y
 
X F  F
 
i
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Reduction rules that go with this same as above except for the following change in the rules
that handle marker introduction
R 	 v  R v if v  xR introR
R 	 v  R if v  xR introR
R 	 v 	R
 
  R v 	R
 
 if v  xR  introR
R 	 v 	R
 
  R 	R
 
if v  xR  introR
Destructive Merge Interpret 	 as  relational composition and allow destructive assign
ment The reduction rule that goes with this is very simple replace all occurrences of 	 in
one go by  and interpret  as  But of course this reduction does not yield DRSs but only
protoDRSs
For the next two perspectives on merging DRSs we need to develop a bit of technique for
handling substitution or more precisely marker renamings
Denition  A marker renaming is a function   U  U  such that its domain Dom 
fv  U j v  vg is nite If  is a renaming with Dom  fv
 
     v
n
g then Rng 
fv
 
     v
n
g A renaming  avoids a set X  U  RngX   If  is a renaming
then v  the renaming  that is like  but for the fact that v  v If X  U then
X  fx j x  Xg A marker renaming  is injective on X  jX j  jX j
We will refer to a renaming  with domain fv
 
     v
n
g as v
 
v
 
     v
n
v
n
 Thus
xy is the renaming  with u  x if u  y and u  u otherwise This renaming is of
course injective on fxg but not on fx yg xy xz is a renaming which is not injective on
fy zg xy xz z  xy
A renaming of a subset of introD intuitively has as its semantic eect that the write
memory of D gets shifted Renaming in a dynamic system like DRT works quite dierently
from variable substitution in classical logic because of the three kinds of marker occurrences
that have to be taken into account x intro and cbnd In particular a renaming of introD
has to satisfy the following requirements

 it should be injective on introD
	 it should avoid xD
 it should leave cbndD untouched
The rst two of these requirements can be imposed globally Requirement iii should be part
of the denition of the eects of renamings on RDRSs we will handle it by distinguishing
between outer and inner renaming For an outer renaming of RDRS R with  we employ
R for an inner renaming R Inner renaming is renaming within a context where marker
introductions act as classical binders ie within the scope of an occurrence of  For example
if   vx wy then
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xyRxy  vyRvy
A renaming  induces functions from terms to terms as follows
t 
 
v if t  v with v  U
t if t  C
A renaming v induces functions from terms to terms as follows
vt 





w if t  w  v with w  U
v if t  v
t if t  C
The induced renaming functions from RDRSs to RDRSs are given by
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 v
  
  
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 v

 t
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 R
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
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plus rules for 	 exactly like those for 
For the semantics let us again assume that a meaning for DRS D is a triple hX Y F i
where X  xD Y  introD and F is the set of assignments satisfying condD
Denition   is a proper renaming for DRS D 
 Dom  introD
  is injective on introD
 Rng  xD  
Denition 	 If F M
U
 F  fg M
U
j g    Fg
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For example if F  ff M
U
j fx  IP g and   yx then
yxF  fg M
U
j g  yxx  IP g  fg M
U
j gy  IP g
Proposition 
 If  is a proper renaming for D and jDj
M
 hX Y F i then jDj
M

hX Y F i
The upshot if this proposition is that a proper renaming only changes the write memory of
a DRS
Deterministic Merge With Substitution The sequence semantics for dynamic predicate
logic dened in Vermeulen 
 can be used as a semantics for a language of unreduced DRSs
R  PUSH v j  j Pt
 
   t
n
j v

 t j R j R
 
	R


where v ranges over a set U of markers without indices The meaning of a variable intro
duction v in sequence semantics is push a new value for v on a stack of v values Clearly
this prevents the destructive use of memory that we saw in connection with denition 

Suggestive notation for this PUSH v
We can reduce expressions of this language to a language of proper DRSs where the markers
are taken from the set of indexed markers U
 
 fu
i
j u  U i 	 g The corresponding merge
reduction rules for this use fully determined renamings as follows
First we do a global renaming by replacing every occurrence of v  U  except those
immediately preceded by a PUSH by v
 
 U
 
 Next assume that we are in a situation
D 	 PUSH v 	 R where D is a DRS no occurrences of PUSH in D no occurrences of 	 in
D Then there are two cases to consider
It may be that v
j
does not occur in xD introD for any index j In that case rewrite
as follows
D 	 PUSH v 	R  D v
 
R
It may also be that v
j
does occur in xD  introD for some index j In that case let i
be supfj  IN j v
j
 xD  introDg and rewrite as follows
D 	 PUSH v 	R  D v
i 
 v
i 
v
i
R
The idea behind these instructions is that if v
j
does not occur in D then v
 
can safely be
introduced and it will actively bind the occurrences of v
 
which occur in open position on
the right If v
j
does occur in D then the present push should aect the vvariables with the
highest index in open position on the right This is precisely what the renaming v
i 
v
i

eects
Indeterministic Merge With Substitution Indeterministic merge does involve a family


of merge operations where  is a renaming that is constrained by the two DRSs D
 
and
D

to be merged in the sense that  is proper for D

and  avoids the set introD
 
xD
 

If the interpretations of D
 
and D

are given by hX
 
 Y
 
 F
 
i and hX

 Y

 F

i respectively
then the interpretation of D
 
	

D

is given by
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hX
 
X

 Y
 
 Y

 F
 
 F

i
If  is constrained in the way stated above this is a proper DRS denotation
The rules for indeterministic merge reduction use renamings as follows we use activR
for introR  xR
R 	 v 





R v if v  activR
Rw if v  activR
w  activR
R 	   R
R 	 Pt
 
     t
n
  RPt
 
     t
n

R 	 R
 
  RR
 

R 	 v 	R
 
 





R vR
 
 if v  activR
Rw wvR
 
if v  activR
w  activR activR
 

R 	  	R
 
  R 	R
 

R 	 Pt
 
     t
n
 	R
 
  RPt
 
     t
n
 	R
 

R 	 R
 
 	R

  RR
 
 	R


R 	 R
 
R

  R 	R
 
 	R


R 	 R
 
	R

  R 	R
 
 	R


Note that under the indeterministicmerge regime 	 does not get an independent semantics
so one cannot talk about the meaning of D 	D
 
anymore only about its meaning modulo
renaming of introD
 
 One can still prove that dierent reductions of R to normal form ie
to proper DRSs are always write variants of one another ie R D and RD
 
together
entail that there is some proper renaming  of D with D  D
 

A set of RDRSs together with a set of merge reduction rules like the example sets given above
is a socalled abstract reduction system Klop 	 and the theory of abstract reduction
systems can fruitfully be applied to their study Van Eijck 
 What all merge reduction
rule sets above with the exception of destructive merge have in common is that they start out
from reducible DRSs and produce proper DRSs as normal forms They all take into account
that the merge operation 	 should not destroy anaphoric links Merge with substitution has
as an additional feature that it preserves anaphoric sockets and that is what we will use
in the sequel For practical reasons we opt for the indeterministic version to avoid possible
confusion due to the appearance of a new kind of indices indicating stack depth
The picture we end up with in indeterministic merge reduction is given in Figure 
 Each
RDRS or DRS has a set of anaphoric plugs and a set of anaphoric sockets The plugs anchor
the representation structure to previous discourse or to contextually given antecedents In
both reduced and unreduced RDRSs these plugs have xed names given by xR The
sockets are the anchoring ground for the next bit of discourse In unreduced RDRSs the
sockets do not have xed names yet and they may not yet represent the full set of anaphoric
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R
plugs sockets
D
plugs named sockets
Figure 
 Unreduced and reduced DRS with plugs and sockets
possibilities of the represented discourse During the process of merge reduction the internal
wiring of the representation structure gets reshu"ed and some members of introR may end
up with a new name to make room for extra sockets If D is a fully reduced DRS however
the sockets have xed names given by introD  xD and this set of markers represents
the full set of anaphoric possibilities for subsequent discourse
Here is a concrete example of how disjoint merging according to the indeterministic merge
regime works

x
man x
enter x
	
x
woman x
smile x

x
man x
enter x
 y
x
x
woman x
smile x

x y
man x
enter x
woman y
smile y
In DRT with indeterministic merge introduced markers are always new so no information
is ever destroyed and merging of representations preserves all anaphoric possibilities of the
parts that are merged
We now know what the basic building blocks of DRT are namely structures as given in 
and what is the glue that puts them together namely the disjoint merge operation involving
marker renaming This concludes the discussion of compositionality for DRSs Quite a few
philosophical and technical questions concerning the natural notion of information ordering
in DRT remain See Visser  for illumination on these matters
	 Disjoint Merge and Memory Management
Reference markers are similar to variables but dier from them in that they are not bound
by logical operators in the usual sense In fact reference markers behave more like variables
in programming languages than like variables in ordinary rst order logic Section  above
Anaphoric links are created by linking new reference markers to available ones How does
one discard references! By deallocating storage space on popping out of a subroutine The
representation in box format for  is given in 
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	
x
man x
enter x

smile x
The semantic treatment of this uses a subroutine for checking if every way of making a
reference to a man who enters where the reference is established via marker x makes the
property given by the consequent of the clause succeed Next the storage space for x is de
allocated which explains why an anaphoric link to a man in subsequent discourse is ruled
out or at least infelicitous see example 

 If a man
 
enters he
 
smiles

He
 
is happy
Thus we see that anaphoric linking is not subsumed under variable binding or at least not
under variable binding perceived in a standard fashion as in rst order logic The process
is much more akin to variable binding in programming where storage space is created and
discarded dynamically and where links to a variable remain possible until the space occupied
by the variable gets deallocated to be used for something else so that further anaphoric
links remain possible as long as the variable space for the antecedent remains accessible
Reference markers as we have seen are allocated pieces of storage space for representations
of things in the world We can picture the building of a representation structure as an
interactive process where we give instructions to make memory reservations and to provide
names for the allocated chunks of memory as in 
 newVar
The system responds by allocating a chunk of memory of the correct size and by returning
a name as value of Var say u indicating that a piece of storage space is allocated and
henceforth known under the name u where  presumably is the oset from the beginning
of the piece of memory where the representation under construction is stored Once storage
space has been allocated to a discourse referent it is useful to know the scope of the allocation
In DRT the scope of the introduction of a discourse referent is closed o by the closest
 operator or the closest  operator in case  is taken as a primitive that has that
introduction in its scope
Of course this interactive picture is an inside picture of what happens during the repre
sentation building process We must also be able to look at the situation from the outside
and answer the question what happens if we assume that we have built and stored two rep
resentation structures D
 
 D

in the memory of a computer one after the other Next we
want to store them in memory simultaneously ie to merge them where the merging has to
preserve sequential order This will in general involve changing the names of those variables
declared in the second representation that would otherwise overwrite the area of memory
already used by the rst representation
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What if some very suspicious semanticist still has qualms about disjoint merge because of
the indeterminism of the operation! We then would have to explain to him or her that
the indeterminism is entirely natural as it reects the fact that the renaming operation is
nothing but the familiar operation of copying variable values to a dierent unused part of
memory before combining two memory states Figure 	 Disjoint merge is indeterministic
# 
Figure 	 Copying registers before merging memory states
simply because any way of copying part of memory to a safe new location will do This
suggests that indeterminism is a strength rather than a weakness of the disjoint merge
The story of a reasonable denition of merge is a story of memory management Assuming
we have an unlimited supply of memory available we may picture the data part of memory
where the active markers of representation structure D reside as an array a     ai   
where the ai are the cells containing the referents pointers to the individuals in the model
under consideration Where exactly in absolute memory representation structureD is stored
is immaterial we assume it is stored in relative memory that is to say at some unknown
osetm from the start of the data part of memory If the marker set activD of structure D
occupies k memory cells and is stored at oset m from the beginning of data memory then
the active markers of D range from am to am# k
As soon as we are willing to keep track of where in relative memory the result of merging
representation structures D
 
and D

is going to reside counting from the oset where D
 
is
stored a deterministic disjoint merge is readily available in terms of a particular renaming 
determined by the memory locations Now the story gets us down to the level of programming
the bare silicon of the discourse representation machine so to speak Assuming the markers
activD
 
 of D
 
reside in memory at u     ui where u  am for some osetm and
the markers activD

 of D

reside in some scratch part of memory s     sj then D
 
and
D

can be merged after a renaming   ui#
s     ui#j#
sj and activD
 
 D


will reside in memory at u     ui# j # 

But once again such a detailed description of the implementation of merge is really un
necessary What we will need for the next section is the assumption that for all R
 
 R

 the
merge R
 
	R

is a welldened reducible discourse representation structure and that the
result of merging R
 
and R

is independent of the choice of marker names in the sense that
the operation does not destroy anaphoric sockets due to variable name clashes This is pre
cisely what we have got in the denition of the merge operation provided by indeterministic
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merge What it all boils down to is this Anaphoric links are essentially arrows pointing
John hates a man who hates him and another man who does not
Figure  Anaphoric links are arrows
from anaphoric expressions to antecedents Figure  Often these links can be represented
by indices as in 

 John
i
hates a man
j
who hates him
i
and another man
j
who does not
The actual choice of the index numbers does not matter What matters is the property of
having the same index In a slogan anaphoric arrows are index pairs 
i
i
 modulo renamings
Of course one might also assume that all indices have been picked appropriately from the
start but as a general strategy this would seem quite unrealistic and in any case the point
we want to make here is that that assumption is not necessary
data
v
Figure  Direct allocation of storage space to variable v
While we are at the topic of memory management we might as well mention that there
are at least two nonequivalent ways in which storage space for reference markers can get
allocated In the rst variant which we have assumed until now on allocating memory and
giving it a name v v becomes the name of the piece of memory containing the data Figure

data
v
Figure  Indirect allocation of storage space to variable v
In the second variant v refers to the data indirectly by pointing to a piece of storage space
containing the data This second variant allows much greater versatility in manipulating data
structures The name v might for instance be used to allocate and point to a new piece of
memory without destroying previous data Figure  Indirect allocation ensures that old
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data
v
Figure  Allocating new memory space to v without destroying old data
data are preserved in memory although they may no longer be accessible under the old name
Figure  The development of a pointer semantics for DRT suggests the use of pointer
stacks to keep track of referents that are contextually salient allowing pointers to be set to
nil to indicate that a referent has drifted out of focus and so on For a detailed account of a
pointer semantics for a variant of DRT we refer the reader to Vermeulen 	

 Constructing DRSs for Natural Language Fragments
As we have seen in Section  there is one sense in which the compositionality of DRT is
unproblematic the representation formalisms DRT proposes are as compositional as one
could like In fact all semantic denitions we have considered in the last three sections from
Denition  onwards have been essentially compositional they either were or else could
readily be converted into compositional denitions of the semantic values that expressions of
these formalisms determine in a model Moreover in the last two sections we have looked at a
number of merge operations for putting two DRSs together into a single one These operations
too we found can be given direct semantic interpretations which map the semantic values
of the component DRSs into the semantic value of the compound
But what about compositionality in the second sense! Does DRT provide a way of an
alyzing fragments of natural language which assigns these fragments a semantics that is
compositional with respect to these fragments themselves a semantics that is compositional
with respect to a natural syntax for these fragments! The original formulation of DRT did
not seem to provide such an analysis and it was even suggested at the time that a composi
tional treatment of the natural language fragments then considered would be impossible In
the meantime we have through the dynamic reformulation of DRT discussed in Sections  
and  come to see that such pessimism is not quite warranted when applied judiciously the
traditional computational methods familiar from Montague Grammar can be made to work
so that they assign sentences and texts from these fragments the same truth conditions as the
original version of DRT It suces to dene the building blocks of DRSs as suitably typed
expressions of a typed language In particular each word of the natural language fragment
in question can be assigned an expression of the typed language as its lexical entry and these
expressions can then be combined by semantic rules corresponding to syntactic composi
tion rules into representations of any given sentence or text of the fragment by an entirely
analogous process one can compute the semantic value of the sentence or text directly from
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the semantic values of the entries of the words composing them
Whether the compositional approach towards DRT which operates under much stricter
constraints than the original DRT approach eg Kamp  Reyle 	 can handle all the
purposes to which DRT has been put is a question to which there is at present no clear
answer We turn to this question briey at the end of this section and again in Section 


A DRS construction algorithm for a given natural language fragment has to provide in
structions for extending a given DRS with the information contained in a sentence from the
fragment This entails that the processing instructions for that sentence should take infor
mation from the previous representation into account In practice this is the list of available
referents Assuming that the representation of the previous discourse is in reduced form
we may take it that we have a list u
 
     u
n
available of reference markers introduced by
previous discourse Pronouns may be resolved to any member of this list and also to markers
that get introduced by antecedents in the sentence under consideration
The process of anaphoric resolution on the basis of available information from the repre
sentation of previous discourse poses a highly nontrivial challenge and it is questionable if
a real algorithm for this process is on the cards The following problem is more manageable
Assuming that an anaphoric indexing for a sentence is given and also that a decision has
been made about the relative scopes of the operators ie a reading of the sentence has been
xed by the sentence grammar give an algorithm for updating an available representation
structure with the information from that sentence In fact as we shall see we get a lot of
this for free because of the presence of the merge operation 	
category abbreviates
CN S E$$$
VP$ ENom$$nS
NPcaseij S EcaseijnS
TVtense VPtense NPAcc$$
DETij NP$ij CN
AUX VPTensed VPInf
REL CNnCN VPTensed
Figure  Category abbreviations for a toy grammar
To illustrate the process of constructing DRSs for natural language fragments we begin by
dening a sentence grammar for a toy fragment Basic categories are S without features for
sentences TXT without features for texts and E with features for case antecedent index i
anaphoric index j for markers for individual entities We assume the category abbreviations
given in Figure  Here the feature variable tense ranges over the values Tensed and Inf
the feature variable case ranges over the values Nom and Acc and the index features range
over the positive natural numbers The example structure generated by this grammar given
in Figure  illustrates how the grammar works Further information about the categorial
format with feature unication is provided in the Chapters on Categorial Grammar and on
Feature Structures in this Handbook
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S
NP$ij VPTensed
DETij CN
CN CNnCN
REL VPTensed
AUX VPInf
TVInf NPAcc$$
Figure  Example of a possible sentence structure according to the toy grammar
expression category translates to type
a
i
DETi   P Qu
i
 P u
i
 Qu
i
 e T e T T
every
i
DETi   P Qu
i
 P u
i
  Qu
i
 e T e T T
no
i
DETi   P Qu
i
 P u
i
 Qu
i
 e T e T T
another
i
j
DETi j  P Qu
i
u
i
 u
j
 P u
i
  Qu
i
 e T e T T
the
i
j
DETi j  P Qu
i
u
i

 u
j
 P u
i
  Qu
i
 e T e T T
his
i
j
DETi j  P Qu
i
poss u
j
 u
i
  P u
i
  Qu
i
 e T e T T
Bill
i
NP  i  P u
i

 b  P u
i
 e T T
who REL  P Q vQv  P v e T e T e T
he
i
NPnom  i  P P u
i
 e T T
him
i
NPacc  i  P P u
i
 e T T
man CN  vman v e T
boy CN  vboy v e T
smiles VPTensed  vsmile v e T
smile VPInf  vsmile v e T
has TVTensed  P uP vposs u v e T T e T
have TVInf  P uP vposs u v e T T e T
hates TVTensed  P uP vhate u v e T T e T
hate TVInf  P uP vhate u v e T T e T
does not AUX  P vP v e T e T
if SSS  p qp  q T T T
 SnTXTS  p qp  q T T T
 TXTnTXTS  p qp  q T T T
Figure  Lexical component of the toy fragment for English
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If we start out with basic types e for entities and T for state transitions not truth values
then the table given in Figure  denes the lexical component of a tiny fragment of English
Variables u v range over type e variables p q over type T  variables PQ over type e T 
variables P over type e T  T 
We distinguish between variables of the typed logic and reference markers ie variables
of the dynamic representation Markers u
i
are taken from a set U which we assume to
be disjoint from the set V
e
of variables of type e Thus from the perspective of the typed
logic the reference markers behave like constants A rather straightforward denition of the
interpretation of a typed expression can now be given in terms of an interpretation function
I  a typed logic variable assignment g and a marker assignment f  This theme is played
sometimes with minor variations in Asher  Bos et al  Kuschert 
 and Muskens

From the point of view of the dynamic logic reference markers are variables to be sure
but as we have seen substitution for dynamic variables is handled quite dierently from
variable substitution in static logics Another way of expressing the relation between typed
variables and reference markers is by saying that 
 reduction which aects typed variables
and merge reduction which aects markers are orthogonal there is no interaction between
the  reduction rules and the 	 reduction rules
The category table in the lexicon makes clear that example sentence 	 has the structure
specied in Figure 
 The man who smiles does not hate Bill
Some other sentences in the fragment are given in  and  we use the particular nouns
and verbs in the table as paradigms of course
 If a man hates Bill he does not smile
 If a bishop meets another bishop he blesses him
For convenience we have assumed that the connective  serves as a discourse constructor
Example  gives a text which is in the fragment
 The man who smiles does not hate Bill He respects Bill
Note that 	 is used for merging of structures in all those cases where renaming may still be
necessary The translations of if and every use p 	 q rather than p q to allow for the
possibility of renaming during the merge of the components
The composition of representation structures for these example sentences is a matter of
routine See Gamut 
 for a didactic account of the general procedure Asher  and
Muskens  for applications in dynamic semantics and Bouchez Van Eijck and Istace 

for a description of an implementation of dynamic semantics using the technique
As an example let us go through the procedure of building a representation for  We
assume the following indexing to indicate the intended anaphoric link
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 The man who smiles
 
does not hate Bill He
 
respects Bill
We also have to choose anaphoric indices for the man who smiles and Bill Assume these to
be 	 and  respectively In the table we nd translation PQvQv	P v for who while
smiles translates as vsmile v These combine by functional application which gives 
after renaming of variables for perspicuity
 QvQv 	 wsmile wv
Expression  
 reduces to 
	 QvQv 	 smile v
Combining  with the translation of man we get 

 vwman wv 	 smile v
Expression  
 reduces to 
 vman v 	 smile v
Combining  with the translation of the
 

gives expression 
 as translation for the
 

man
who smiles
 Qu
 
 u
 

 u

	 wman w 	 smile wu
 
 	Qu
 

Applying 
 reduction to expression 
 gives 	
 Qu
 
 u
 

 u

	man u
 
 	 smile u
 
 	Qu
 

In a similar way we get  for does not hate Bill



 uu


 b 	 hate u u


Combining 	 and  gives the translation of the rst sentence of 
 u
 
 u
 

 u

	man u
 
 	 smile u
 
u


 b 	 hate u
 
 u


Merge reduction of  with the identical renaming gives
 u
 
 u
 

 u

man u
 
 smile u
 
u


 b hate u
 
 u


In box format
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
u
 
u
 

 u

man u
 
smile u
 

u


 b
hate u
 
 u


The translation of the second sentence of  is 
 u


 b 	 respect u
 
 u


One merge reduction step with identical renaming
	 u


 b respect u
 
 u


The translation of discourse  is the result of applying the semantic operation for text
composition the semantics for  in the lexicon table to  and  in that order

 pqp	qu
 
 u
 

 u

man u
 
 smile u
 
u


 b hate u
 
 u

 u


 b respect u
 
 u


Two 
 reductions and one further merge reduction with identical renaming gives the following
result in box format

u
 
u
 

 u

man u
 
smile u
 

u


 b
hate u
 
 u


u


 b
respect u
 
 u


The fact that no new discourse referent gets introduced for the proper name Bill is a reection
of our treatment of proper names Here is the entry for proper names in the lexicon table
again
expression category translates to type
Bill
i
NP$$i P u
i

 b 	 P u
i
 eTT
Here i is the index that links the constant b for the proper name to its external anchor
Anaphoric links involving proper names are insensitive to where the name gets introduced
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TXT
TXT S S
TXT 
TXT S S
S 
Figure 
 The structure of a three sentence text in our grammar setup
for they are interpreted as links where the anaphor and the proper name are both anaphoric
expressions with a common externally given antecedent
At this point a couple of remarks are in order about the rules of index assignment which
are part of our present treatment The rst remark concerns the lower indices which we
have been assuming must be assigned not only to pronouns but in fact to denite noun
phrases of any kind The requirement that every denite NP must receive a lower index
reects the socalled familiarity principle see Heim 	
 according to which a denite NP
is used felicitously only when the utterance context already contains a reference marker for
its referent which can then serve as anaphoric antecedent for the NP It is doubtful that
the familiarity principle can be upheld in as rigid and comprehensive a form as this in which
it is taken to apply to every occurrence of every type of denite noun phrase The denite
description the man who smiles in 	 is a case in point It would certainly be possible to
use this phrase for picking out from a given crowd the unique person smiling pretty much
as many philosophers from Frege and Russell onwards have been claiming about denite
descriptions Such a use could easily occur in a context in which no reference marker for the
smiling man had as yet been introduced A treatment of denite descriptions which insists
on the presence of antecedent reference markers for denites could still be saved by assuming
that denite descriptions always come with a presupposition that the context contains such a
reference marker but that this presupposition can be easily accommodated when necessary
One may have ones doubts about the plausibility of this rescue strategy But even if we
go along with it we will have to reformulate our semantics in such a way that it allows for
such accommodations and allows them to be made at those points where human interpreters
would have to make them In other words the theory will have to be restated so that it can
deal with aspects of presupposition Unfortunately this is a matter that we cannot go into
for reasons of space For the treatment of presupposition within DRT see the bibliographical
remarks in section 

A similar remark is in order about the lower indices of proper names such as John Does
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the use of a proper name presuppose that its referent is already represented in the given
context! Perhaps but if so then context needs to be construed in a quite liberal way So
before such a treatment of proper names can be considered satisfactory much more needs to
be said about how the notion of context is to be construedwhat kinds of information may
contexts include from what kinds of contexts can their information come etc
The second remark concerns the implicit assumption that the texts to which our theory
is applied come fully equipped with all the necessary upper and lower indices and that all
of these have been assigned in advance One way in which this assumption gets us into
diculties shows up in the text 
 which has the structure indicated in Figure 

 A man
 
who mistrusted the assistant


walked in He
 
asked for the manager


 He

turned out to be on holiday
As the text structure indicates rst representations are built for the rst two sentences and
these are merged together and only then is a representation for the third sentence merged
with the representation of the preceding discourse Note that in this case the merge of the
representations of the rst and the second sentence would involve a renaming of the discourse
referent for the manager to avoid a clash with the marker for the assistant from the rst
sentence This means that the anaphoric index 	 in the third sentence is not going to pick
up a reference to the manager anymore as was presumably intended
The example points towards an aspect of DRT that deserves comment DRTthis is as
true of the form in which it was originally stated as it is of the dynamic formulation presented
hereis not a theory of anaphora resolution the theory itself tells us little about how to
select the intended antecedent for a given anaphoric expression from among a number of
possible candidates The only substantive contribution which classical DRT makes to the
problem of anaphora resolution consists in what it has to say about the accessibility of
reference markers that have been introduced in one part of a text to anaphoric expressions
occurring elsewhere see eg Kamp  Reyle 	 Ch 
 but this is only a small part of a
comprehensive account of anaphora resolution capable of predicting the intended anaphoric
connections in all cases in which these are evident to a human interpreter
Arguably this is as it should be It would be unreasonable to demand of a theory of
linguistic semanticsand it is that which DRT originally aimed atthat it incorporate a
detailed account of anaphora resolution which would have to rely on a host of pragmatic
principles as well as on an indenite amount of world knowledge
It seems not unreasonable however to demand of such a theory that it oer a suitable
interface to other pragmatic and or extralinguistic components of a comprehensive theory
of meaning which are designed to deal with anaphora resolution see Sidner  Webber 
and Chapter 
 of Alshawi cs 	 and to allow these other components to come into action
at those points when the information needed for anaphora resolution has become available
and the resolution is necessary for interpretation to proceed To insist that all upper and
lower indexation take place in advance of interpretation would y in the face of this demand
For as a rule it is only through and thus after interpretation of the earlier parts of a discourse
that the correct links for subsequent anaphoric expressions can be established
 The Proper Treatment of Quantication in DRT 
  The Proper Treatment of Quantification in DRT
As we have seen above universal quantication can be treated in terms ofD  D
 
 which can
in turn be taken as an abbreviation of DD
 
 Look at the treatment of the quantiers
every and no in the fragment given above
expression category translates to type
every
i
DETi$ PQu
i
	 P u
i
 	 Qu
i
 eTeTT
no
i
DETi$ PQu
i
	 P u
i
 	Qu
i
 eTeTT
Working out an example like Every man walks on the basis of this gives the following repre
sentation after merge reduction xman xwalk x This is equivalent to xman x
walk x In box notation

x
man x

walk x
The treatment of every creates the impression that the quanticational force resides in the
dynamic implication Note by the way that all occurrences of marker x in representation
	 are classically bound The same holds for more complex examples like the representation
for  in 
 Every man who meets a nice woman smiles at her

x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meetxy

z
z

 y
smileat xz
Now consider sentence 
 Most men who meet a nice woman smile at her
This sentence is true if most individuals which satisfy the descriptive content of the subject
NP also satisfy the VP ie if most men who meet a nice woman have the property of smiling
at her Note that assessing the truth of  involves two classes of men the class of men
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who meet a nice woman and the class of men who meet a nice woman and smile at her the
sentence is true roughly if the cardinality of the second class is more than half that of the
rst Note that the truth conditions do not involve the comparison of two sets of pairs of
individualsthey do not compare the set of pairs a b such that a is a man b a nice woman
and a meets b with the set of pairs a b such that a is a man b a nice woman a meets b
and a smiles at b One can see this by considering a situation in which one man meets lots of
women and smiles at them all whereas the other men say there are 	 of them meet very
few women and never smile at any With regard to such a situation intuition says that  is
false even though the pairs a b such that a smiles at b may be a clear majority within the
set of pairs a b such that a is a man b is a nice woman and a meets b
Thus while the treatment of universal quantication in  creates the impression that the
quanticational force resides somehow in the dynamic implication  we cannot hope that
this can be extended to nonstandard quantiers by working out special variants of dynamic
implication For suppose that we represent  as 

x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meetxy

m

z
z

 y
smileat xz
The semantics of 
m
 is given by
	
s
D
 

m
 D


M
s
 
i s  s
 
and for most assignments s
 
with
s
D
 

M
s
 
there is an
assignment s

with
s
D


M
s


Unfortunately this analysis gives the wrong truth conditions In the example case it quan
ties over manwoman pairs instead of individual men This problem called the proportion
problem in the literature suggests that generalised quantiers be added explicitly to the
representation language see the Chapter on Quantication in this Handbook
Assuming that what is true formost holds in essence also for every the above considerations
show that the roles which x and y play in  are not identical The role played by x the
variable bound by the quantier is special in that it is x and only x which determines
between which sets the generalised quantier relation expressed by the determiner of the
quantifying NP can be said to hold A notation that singles out the variable of quantication
achieves this These considerations lead to the following Generalised Quantier notation for
 and 
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
EVERY x
y
man x
woman y
nice y
meetxy
z
z

 y
smileat xz
	
MOST x
y
man x
woman y
nice y
meetxy
z
z

 y
smileat xz
We can now revise the treatment of quantication in our fragment and extend the coverage
to other nonstandard quantiers such as most at most half at least seven as follows
expression category translates to type
every
i
DETi  P QEVERY u
i
P u
i
 Qu
i
 eTeTT
no
i
DETi  P QNO u
i
P u
i
 Qu
i
 eTeTT
most
i
DETi  P QMOST u
i
P u
i
 Qu
i
 eTeTT
at least n
i
DETi  P QAT LEAST n u
i
P u
i
 Qu
i
 eTeTT
The intended interpretation of this also takes care of the internal dynamics of the quanti
cation We use sx for an assignment which diers at most from s in the value assigned to
x and M s j D for truth in M given s


s
QxD
 
 D


M
s
 
i s  s
 
and the set of assignments sx for which M sx j D
 
is
Qrelated to the set of assignments sx for which M sx j D
 
	D


Note the fact that the meaning of D
 
gures both in the denition of the restriction set R
of the quantier and in the denition of its body set B The reason for this is that D
 
may
introduce referents that have to be resolved in order to get at the meaning of the body set
In the example sentence we have to compare the set of men who meet a nice woman with the
set of men who meet a nice woman at whom they smile Saying that we want to compare
the set of men who meet a nice woman with that of men who smile at her will not do for
the specication of the second set contains an unresolved pronominal reference
It seems intuitively clear that the pronoun her is to be interpreted as anaphoric to the
indenite NP a woman It is one of the central claims of DRT that this kind of anaphoric
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connection is possible because the material of the quantifying sentence that makes up the
restrictor is also implicitly part of the quantiers body This principle also explains why
natural language quantiers are always conservative ie express relations between sets with
the property that for any sets A and B A stands in the relation to B i it stands in the
relation to A B They satisfy this equation because a natural language quantication with
restrictor condition P and body conditionQ has a logical form to the eect that the quantier
relation holds between the extension of P and the extension of P Q Conservativity is built
directly into the logical form
For the example sentence with most  gives the following meaning for most men who
meet a nice woman it holds that they smile at at least one nice woman that they meet This is
called the weak reading of the dynamic generalised quantier Note that under the semantics
given above EVERY x yRxy Sxy is not equivalent to x yRxy Sxy In the rst
expression y has existential force in the second y has universal force There is no perfect
agreement among speakers whether  and  can be interpreted as having the weak reading
Some prefer the socalled strong reading
	
s
QxD
 
 D


M
s
 
i s  s
 
and the set of assignments sx for which M sx j D
 
is
Qrelated to the set of assignments sx for which M sx j D
 
	 D


Under this interpretation for the quantiers EVERY x yRxy Sxy and x yRxy
Sxy are equivalent
In the denition of strong readings for the quantiers we again use the restriction set to
resolve pronominal references in the specication of the body set and again the conservativity
property of the generalized quantier denotation ensures that this does not change the truth
conditions In example case  the strong reading can be paraphrased as for most men who
meet a nice woman it holds that they smile at all the nice women that they meet See the
Chapter on Quantication in this Handbook for more information on how to choose between
weak and strong readings of dynamic quantiers
   Representing Tense and Aspect in Texts
As was said in Section 	 above discourse representation theory was motivated by a desire to
give a systematic account of the interpretation of unbound nominal and temporal anaphora
in context In example 
 there is not only an intended anaphoric link between the indenite
subject of the rst sentence and the pronominal subject of the second but also between the
tenses of the verbs in the two sentences
	 A man entered the White Hart He smiled
The events described in example 
 are naturally understood as sequential with the event
of entering preceding the event of smiling Also the past tense indicates that both events
precede the time of speech A plausible DRS representation for the example that makes this
temporal anaphoric link explicit is given in 	
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	
u
 
u

u

e
 
e

man u
 
u


 WH
enter e
 
 u
 
 u


te
 
  n
u


 u
 
smile e

 u


te
 
  te


te

  n
In this representation we have given the verbs a Davidsonian event argument Davidson 
	
and we have assumed that te denotes the temporal interval during which the event e takes
place Also we assume that n now refers to an interval during which the text is uttered
the speech interval
As the example representation indicates we assume an ontology of events with temporal
intervals at which these take place Furthermore we assume that the set of temporal intervals
is ordered by precedence  and by temporal inclusion v We assume that t
 
 t

expresses
that interval t
 
completely precedes t

 ie the end of t
 
is before the beginning of t

 while
t
 
v t

expresses that the beginning of t

is not later than the beginning of t
 
and the end of
t

is not earlier than the end of t
 

It is plausible to further assume that  is irreexive and transitive while v is a partial
order reexive and transitive Also the following are plausible interaction principles
monotonicity x v y  y  z  u v z x  u
convexity x v u  x  y  y  z  z v u y v u
But we will not dwell on the underlying temporal ontology for further information on the
temporal logic of intervals we refer to the Chapter on Temporality of this Handbook and to
Van Benthem 
In 	 the smiling event e

is represented as following the entering event e
 
 This is intu
itively as it should be and has to do with the fact that in 
 the sentence reporting the smiling
event comes after the one which reports the entering event Note that the interpretation
given in 	 is not or only barely available when the sentences of 
 are reversed However
the order in which the sentences of a text appear is only one of several factors that determine
the temporal relations between the events they mention A second factor is aspect For
instance when we replace the nonprogressive smiled in 
 by the progressive was smiling
there is a strong tendency to understand the smiling as something that was going on while
the man was entering the White Hart the progressive of an activity verb like smile suggests
at least in narrative passages such as 
 simultaneity with the last mentioned event rather
than succession to it Similarly simultaneity rather than succession is suggested by a stative
verb such as like For instance in
	 A man
 
entered the White Hart

 He
 
smiled He
 
liked the place


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the mans liking of the White Hart is not naturally interpreted as having been the case
only after his smiling Rather it seems that the state of aairs of his liking the establish
ment obtained already as he was smiling and possibly even before he came in Thus the
representation of  should be as in 
	
u
 
u

u

u

u

e
 
e

e

man u
 
u


 WH
enter e
 
 u
 
 u

 te
 
  n
smile e

 u

 u


 u
 
te
 
  te


te

  n
u


 u
 
place u

 u


 u

like e

 u

 u

 te

 v te


te

  n
When we consider the question whether one should assume that the mans liking the place
in  anteceded his entering the White Hart we perceive a further factor that is important
for the interpretation of temporal relations In order that a text is perceived as coherent its
successive sentences must be seen as standing in certain rhetorical relations to each other
Halliday  Hasan 	 Mann  Thompson 	 One such relation is explanation a relation
which holds between two neighbouring sentences or sometimes larger units consisting of
several sentences when the later sentence or sentence group provides an explanation for what
is claimed by the earlier sentence or group Like many other rhetorical relations explanation
carries certain implications form temporal order For instance when say two sentences S and
S
 
are interpreted as standing in the explanation relation with S
 
providing an explanation
for what is said in S the event or state described by S
 
cannot be later than that described
in S We see this when we look closely at  the mans liking the place can either be taken
as an explanation of his smiling or as an explanation of why the man went to the White Hart
in the rst place The rst interpretation entails that his liking the place did not start after
his smiling but it leaves open whether he liked the place only upon entering it or already
before According to the second interpretation the man must have liked the place even before
he went in
We have dwelt on this dimension of the interpretation of the temporal relations in  to
indicate how complicated the matter of interpreting temporal relations is and how much it
depends on pragmatic factors such as discourse coherence and rhetorical relations Just as
with pronominal anaphora linguistic form does in general no more than impose a frame of
constraints within which the precise interpretation of temporal relations must be decided on
other grounds
For a presentation of the semantics of temporal reference within the very limited space
available here this poses a dilemma On the one hand a presentation that does justice to
what is now known about the interactions between the dierent factors mentioned above is
out of the question On the other a general treatment of the purely grammatical constraints
on temporal reference would in view of its inevitable lack of specicity be rather uninforma
 Representing Tense and Aspect in Texts 	
tive We have therefore chosen to concentrate on a certain small subclass of texts in which
rhetorical relations are fully determined by linguistic form by the order of the sentences in
the text by the tenses of the verbs and by their aspectual properties 
 and  are both
instances of this class
The central idea behind the treatment we will present goes back to Reichenbach 
The interpretation of the tenses involves relating the event or state described to a reference
point For instance for unembedded cases of the simple past tense the reference point is
provided by the context in which the given past tense sentence occurs In texts of the kind
to which our theory is intended to apply it is the immediately preceding sentence which
supplies the reference point How the reference point is used to temporally locate the event
or state described by the sentence in question depends on whether the sentence has stative
or nonstative aspect or what comes to the same in our terminology whether what the
sentence describes is a state or an event For past tense sentences the dierence that aspect
makes is illustrated by the distinct interpretations that are assigned to the second and the
third sentence of the event described by the second sentence is interpreted as following
the reference point by the preceding sentence the state described by the third sentence as
obtaining at the reference point provided by its predecessor Moreover an event sentence
like the second sentence of  resets the reference point it inherits from the context to the
event it itself introduces whereas a stative sentence like the third one passes the reference
point on to the next sentence unchanged To test this see what happens when one adds a
fourth sentence stative or nonstative on to 
Besides playing a role in locating the described event or state in relation to the reference
point tense forms usually also have an absolute semantic impact in that they relate the
described state or event to the utterance time For instance unembedded occurrences of
the past tense imply that the state or event lies before the utterance time and unembedded
occurrences of the English present tense imply with few exceptions location at the utterance
time
For the limited domain to which our mini theory is meant to apply the use and mod
ication of reference points can be elegantly handled along the lines proposed by Muskens
 As noted there in a dynamic setup it is natural to implement the reference interval as
a register r to which a new value get assigned for a nonstative verb while the value is unaf
fected for stative verbs For instance the lexical entry for smiled species that the interval
of the smiling event is constrained to follow the current reference interval that the reference
interval is reset to the interval of the event and that the event interval has to precede the
interval of speech
ve smile e v r  te r  te r  n
Here r  te is shorthand for r r

 te
For verbs denoting stative events the representation is the same except for the fact that
now the current reference interval has to be included in the event interval and the reference
interval is not reset Here is a lexical entry for liked 
PuPve like e u v rv te r  n
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Figure 

 gives a list of lexical entries for stative and nonstative main verbs and for temporal
auxiliary verbs
expression category translates to type
does not AUX  P vP v r v n e T e T
did not AUX  P vP v r  n e T e T
will AUX  P vP vn  r e T e T
will not AUX  P vP vn  r e T e T
smiles VPTensed  ve smile e v r  te r 	 te r v n e T
smiled VPTensed  ve smile e v r  te r 	 te r  n e T
smile VPInf  ve smile e v r  te r 	 te e T
hates TVTensed  P uP vehate e u v r v te r v n e T T e T
hated TVTensed  P uP vehate e u v r v te r  n e T T e T
hate TVInf  P uP vehate e u v r v te e T T e T
likes TVTensed  P uP ve like e u v r v ter v n e T T e T
liked TVTensed  P uP ve like e u v r v ter  n e T T e T
like TVInf  P uP ve like e u v r v te  e T T e T
Figure 

 Lexical entries for main and auxiliary verbs
Note that in dening disjoint merge for fragments involving the markers r and n for the
reference and the speech interval we have to make sure that these never get renamed For n
we get this for free for an inspection of the lexical entries makes clear that n is a xed marker
of every DRS as it never gets introduced For r matters are dierent r  te is shorthand
for r r

 te so r does get introduced But we do not want r  te
 
D
 
	 r  te

D

to reduce to r  te
 
D r
 
 te

 r
 
rD

 To ensure that this does not happen it is
enough to exclude r from the set of reference markers this guarantees that r  te
 
D
 
 r 
te

D

is a proper DRS if D
 
D

is one because r  intror  te

D


Let us go through the procedure of building the representation for  assuming the an
tecedent and anaphoric indices to be as given in the example The representation of entered
the White Hart becomes 
	
PuPve enter e u v r  te r  te r  n
P u


 WH 	 P u


After 
 reduction
	 uu


 WH 	 e enter e u u

 r  te r  te r  n
Combining with the translation of a man and reducing the result gives 
	 u
 
	man u
 
	 u


 WH 	 e enter e u
 
 u

 r  te r  te r  n
Merge reduction with the identical renaming gives
		 u
 
man u
 
 u


 WH e enter e u
 
 u

 r  te r  te r  n
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Similarly we get for he smiled after 
 and merge reduction
	
 e smilee u
 
 r  te r  te r  n
The text consisting of the rst two sentences gets the following translation after 
 reduction


u
 
man u
 
 u


 WH e enter e u
 
 u

 r  te r  te r  n
	 e smilee u
 
 r  te r  te r  n
After merge reduction this becomes


u
 
man u
 
 u


 WH e enter e u
 
 u

 r  te r  te r  n
e

 smilee

 u
 
 r  te

 r  te

 r  n
The translation of the third sentence from the discourse after 
 and merge reduction

 u

 u


 u

 place u

 e likee u
 
 u

 r v te r  n
The translation of the whole example after 
 and merge reduction


u
 
man u
 
 u


 WH e enter e u
 
 u

 r  te r  te r  n
e

 smilee

 u
 
 r  te

 r  te

 r  n
u

 u


 u

 place u

 e

 likee

 u
 
 u

 r v te

 r  n
Evidently this treatment of temporal reference is to be seen as no more than a hint of the
direction that a fully edged account of tense and aspect for a language like English might
take One feature of our treatment that ought to be changed is the use of separate lexical
entries for full forms of verbs such as smiled and smiles What one would like to have instead
is specications of the meaning and or function of the dierent tenses such that when these
are applied to the entries for the innitival forms of our minilexicon we get the entries of the
corresponding full forms as results For instance one might consider assigning the Simple
Past the following entry
expression category translates to type
Simple Past VPTensed VPPerf PvP v r  n eTeT
Indeed applying this entry to the entries for smile and like produces the translations that
our lexicon species for smiled and liked
But here it behoves to repeat an earlier caveat Tense forms do not always function in
the same way In particular embedded occurrences of tenses often behave quite dierently
than when they occur in unembedded positions To cite just one example involving the
simple past recall Bakers %I thought you were going to say that you had only one trick to
play& Here the past tense of had is compatible with the event in question being located in
the future of the utterance time So if we adopt the entry just proposed as entry for the
Past Tense in general we will have to distinguish carefully between occurrences of the Past
 Representing Tense and Aspect in Texts 
Tense in the semantic sense characterized by this entry on the one hand and on the other
hand arbitrary occurrences of simple past tense morphology But this is a distinction which
requires a careful revision of the syntaxsemantics interface used in our minifragment and
it is only one example among many which render such a revision necessary
Another matter which seriously complicates the treatment of temporal reference is aspect
We already saw that the temporal relations between the states and events that are mentioned
by sentences in a text depend in part on the aspectual properties of those sentences ie in
our terminology on whether what they describe is a state or an event and that the aspectual
properties of those sentences depend in their turn on the aspectual properties of the verbs
they contain However as noted explicitly rst in Verkuyl  the aspectual properties of a
sentence depend not just on its verb but on several other factors as well Prominent among
those factors is the question whether the verb has been modied by some aspectual operator
such as the English perfect or progressive or aspectual control verbs such as begin stop or
go on It is natural to try and treat aspectual modiers along the same lines as we have
suggested for the tenses viz by assigning them their own lexical entries which then should
combine systematically with the entry of any verb to which the operators can be applied
eg through functional application of the operator entry to the verb entry But here
we encounter a new diculty which is especially noticeable in relation to the progressive
and known in that context as the imperfective paradox A simpleminded analysis of the
progressive might treat it as transforming a given verb phrase VP into one which describes
a process or state holding at precisely those times that fall within the duration of any state
or event described by VP With telic verbal predicates such as cross the street however this
analysis breaks down for a sentence involving the progressive of such a verb phrase can be
true at times when an event described by the embedded VP did not actually happen For
instance The old lady was crossing the street may be true with respect to times not included
in the duration of any crossingthestreet event For the lady may have changed her mind
when she got halfway and turned around to the sidewalk from which she started or she may
have become a victim to the incalculable brutalities of motorized trac Thus the semantic
relation between progressives and their underlying VPs is in general an intensional rather
than a purely extensional one and a fully satisfactory analysis of this intensional relationship
is still lacking
Formulating an entry for the English perfect which transforms a verb phrase VP into
one which describes result states of events or states described by VP may at rst seem less
problematic the states described by the application of the perfect hold at precisely those
times which follow a state or event of the type dened by the operand But when one looks
at the semantics of the perfect more closely such simplicity proves illusory It is part of the
meanings of many perfects that the event of which the described state is understood to be the
result did not just happen at some earlier time or other but that it happened only recently or
that its inuence is still tangible at the time of the result state and these additional meaning
components cannot be analyzed in purely extensional terms any more than the relationship
between progressive and nonprogressive uses of telic verb phrases
For the perfect it is nevertheless possible to nesse the intensionality problem by assuming
a relation  between events and states which holds between e and e
 
when e
 
is the result
state of e We adopt the obvious assumption that e  e
 
entails te  te
 
 Using  
 Representing Tense and Aspect in Texts 
might be represented as 

 Bill has smiled


e
 
e

u

 b
smile e
 
 u
e
 
 e

te

 v n
This does not yet constrain the eect on the wider context The eect is roughly this First
the current value of the reference interval is saved Then r is reset to a value earlier than its
old value Next the verb is evaluated with respect to the shifted reference interval Then the
old value is restored and nally the reference interval is located with respect to the speech
interval Muskens 
Using o as a store for the old value of r we get the following DRS that also takes the
external eects into account


e
 
e

o
u

 b
o

 r

r
r  o
smile e
 
 u
e
 
 e

r  te
 

r  te


r v n
For a compositional account we have to assume that we can get access to the event parameter
of a verb so a typical entry for untensed verbs will now look like this
expression category translates to type
smile VPInf evsmile e v r  te r  te eeT
The entry of the perfective operator introduces two events the verb phrase event and the
consequent state assume R ranges over type e e T 
expression category translates to type
PERF VPPerf Rve
 
 e

 o  r eeT
VPInf r r  oRe
 
v e
 
 e

 eT
r  te

 r  te


	 Extensions and Variations 
Temporal auxiliaries will now have the eect of putting further temporal constraints as
discussed above For instance the present tense form has of the perfect auxiliary have could
be given the following entry
expression category translates to type
has VPTensed VPPerf PvP v r v n eTeT
This section has presented a catalogue of problems rather than a list of fully satisfactory
solutions The emphasis on problems with the analysis of tense and aspect may have served to
illustrate a dilemma that one faces in formal approaches to the semantics of natural language
discourse such as DRT The dilemma is this the more closely one tries to stick to the ideal of
strict compositionality when dealing with the manifold complexities of the syntaxsemantics
interface of natural languages the trickier the analysis tends to become especially if discourse
eects are to be taken into account too
There exists a good deal of work within DRT current as well as past which has been
prepared to sacrice certain aspects of this ideal in pursuit of a more exible architecture
that can be tted more easily to the requirements that certain linguistic phenomena seem to
impose This does not mean that this work ignores the fundamental compositional imperative
of explaining how grammars can be nitely encoded and languages can be used by beings
whose knowledge of language takes this nitary form In particular a good part of the work
within DRT on the problems of tense and aspect has opted for such a relaxation of strict
compositionality However experience of the past ten years has shown that often once the
phenomena have been properly understood and have been given a systematic description
using means that are not strictly compositional it is then possible to also nd a way of
accounting for those phenomena that is strictly compositional as well as attractive in other
ways Whether attractive strictly compositional solutions will become available in all cases
is yet to be seen
  Extensions and Variations
An important extension of the representation language concerns the singular plural distinc
tion Singular and plural reference markers should be distinguished and a constraint imposed
that singular pronouns are linked to singular discourse referents plural pronouns to plural
reference markers Accounting for plural anaphoric possibilities along these lines involves
quite a lot of further work however as delicate issues concerning the formation of plurals by
means of summation and abstraction and the interpretation of dependent plurals have to be
dealt with Kamp and Reyle 	 Chapter 
Another fruitful application area for theories about the representation of discourse in con
text is the area of presupposition Presuppositions can get cancelled or weakened by an
evolving context in other words presupposition projection is a dynamic phenomenon Ap
proaches to presupposition in connection with discourse representation are of two kinds The
rst kind exploits the representationalism inherent in the framework See eg Van der Sandt

 where the presupposition facts get accounted for in terms of manipulations of the repre
sentations The second kind does not assume representationalism but exploits the dynamic
	 Extensions and Variations 
aspect of the theory by providing a partial dynamic semantics tting the presupposition facts
See eg the account of the presuppositions of denite descriptions in Van Eijck 
 which
does not depend on properties of the representations but only on the underlying error state
semantics Further references in the Chapter on Presupposition in this Handbook
A next extension concerns the representation of belief sentences The Hob Nob sentence
from Section 	 provides an example of a belief puzzle that seems amenable to solution within
the present framework A theory of representation of discourse in context holds a particular
promise for the treatment of belief because the representation structures themselves could be
viewed as a kind of mental representation language thus a belief relation could typically be
modelled as a relation between a subject and a representation structure Asher 
The plausibility of using Discourse Representation Structures to model belief and other
propositional attitudes is closely connected with the existence of cognitively plausible infer
ence systems for DRSs For work on proof theories for DRSs see Sedogbo and Eytan 
Saurer 	 and Kamp and Reyle 	
A dierent approach is reasoning about discourse structures with assertion logic and dy
namic logic Assume a language of quantied dynamic logic with discourse representation
structures as program modalities hDi and D Then hDi and D get interpreted as
follows
	 M s j hDi i there is an s
 
with
s
D
M
s
 
and M s j 
	 M s j D i for all s
 
with
s
D
M
s
 
it holds thatM s
 
j 
An axiomatisation of discourse representation theory along the same lines as the calculus for
dynamic predicate logic 
 given in Van Eijck 
 is now readily available Some example
principles of this calculus are
hDi D  
hD

 D

i D

hD

i  
hD

D

i hD

ihD

i
For marker introduction we have
hui  u
or dually
u 
u
For atoms we have
hPt

   t
n
i Pt
 
   t
n
 

 Further Reading 
or dually
Pt

   t
n
 Pt
 
   t
n
 
The calculus nicely demonstrates the way in which discourse representation theory gives
universal force to the markers introduced in the antecedent of an ifthen clause

 If a man greets a woman he smiles at her

	 xMx yWyGxy Sxy
The truth conditions of  represented as  are given by the following calculation that uses
the principles above
hxMxyWyGxy  Sxyi
 xMx yWyGxyhSxyi
 xMxyWyGxyhSxyi
 
xMxyWyGxyhSxyi
   
 
xMx 
yWy  Gxy  Sxy
An important new direction is the theory of Underspecied Discourse Representation Struc
tures which allows for representations that leave certain matters such as scope relations
between quantiers and other operators the distinction between distributive and collective
readings of plural NPs that between dierent readings of a given lexical item etc undecided
This work is of particular interest insofar as it has succeeded in developing proof theories that
operate directly on the underspecied representations themselves Reyle  
  Further Reading
Two key publications on discourse representation are Heim 	
 and Kamp 	 which address
themselves specically to the problem of the interpretation of indenite descriptions and
their interaction with unbound and transsentential anaphora Temporal anaphora a kind
of anaphora that is largely transsentential is treated along the same lines in Kamp and
Rohrer 	 A systematic presentation of discourse representation theory including various
later developments is given in Kamp and Reyle 	 Asher  extends DRT to a more
comprehensive theory which among other things also takes discourse structure and rhetorical
relations into account The connections between the principles of DRT and those of generative
syntax are explored in depth in Chierchia 

 Questions of lexical semantics from a DR
theoretical perspective are explored in Kamp and Rossdeutscher 	
A precursor paper is Karttunen 	 Examples of related approaches to semantics which
have also advocated focusing on the discourse level are Seurens discourse semantics 
Barwises dynamic interpretation of anaphora  and the game theoretical school of Hintikka
cs 		
Further references on the connection with dynamic reasoning are given in the Chapter on
Dynamics in this Handbook Connections between discourse representation and type theory
References 
are sketched in Ahn and Kolb 
 Connections between discourse representation and game
theoretical semantics are given in Van Benthem and Van Eijck 
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